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INTRODUCTION
Environmental regulations cannot end at state borders. Because
ecosystems, individual species, and pollution do not respect political
boundaries, there is a growing necessity for international environmental
* Law Clerk, The Honorable Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York. J.D., Syracuse University College of Law
(1996); M.S., State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry
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agreements.' However, to implement effective environmental
agreements, States must confront several problems specific to the
international environmental arena. First, international environmental
agreements often require extensive monitoring over large geographic
areas. Second, international environmental agreements require the
political will and legal apparatus to ensure the compliance of disparate
actors. Finally, States must be prepared to enforce international
commitments beyond their individual territorial borders.2
The area of the planet's surface that is covered by ocean is im-
mense.3 In fact, there are over twice as many square miles of ocean as
there are surface land. To put this vastness in perspective, driftnet fish-
ing in the northern Pacific alone encompasses an area the size of the
United States Because fishing and whaling boats generally operate un-
observed in international waters, there is little scientific information on
the impact of fishing and whaling on the marine ecosystem. Indeed, the
1. The recent dispute between Canada and the United States over migrating salmon il-
lustrates this necessity. On July 19, 1997, a flotilla of Canadian fishing boats blockaded an
Alaskan ferry from leaving port in Prince Rupert, British Columbia. Almost one hundred
Canadian fisherman claimed that Americans were taking more than five hundred thousand
sockeye salmon as they swam through Alaskan waters on their way south to Canada to
spawn. See Timothy Egan, Salmon War in Northwest Spurs Wish for Good Fences, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1997, at A26. After three days of intense negotiations, the ferry was per-
mitted to depart. Anthony DePalma, Canadians End Blockade in Salmon-Fishing Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at A6. For a discussion of fishing agreements involving Canada
and the United States, see infra Part IV.
2. The term "enforcement" is used broadly, encompassing both voluntary and invol-
untary mechanisms for ensuring compliance. In environmental law, the ultimate aim is the
protection of the environment; accordingly, as used here the paramount purpose of enforce-
ment is to obtain compliance before violations occur.
3. Oceans cover approximately 71% or 360 million square kilometers of the Earth's
surface and contain 97% of the planet's free water. DAvID J. BRIGGS & PETER SMITHSON,
FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 231, 243 (1986). The average depth of the
world's oceans is about 3.9 kilometers; maximum depths can exceed eleven kilometers. Id. at
231-32.
4. The distribution of ocean basins and continents is unevenly arranged over the earth's
surface. ARTHUR N. STRAHLER, INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 48 (3d ed. 1973).
In the northern hemisphere the ratio of land to ocean is about 1 to 1.5. The ratio of land to
oceanin the Southern Hemisphere is 1 to 4. Id.; see also BRIGGS & SMITHSON, supra note 3.
5. William T. Burke, Driftnets and Nodules: Where Goes the United States?, 21
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 237, 239 (1990).
6. The extent of past violations of international marine laws is staggering. For exam-
ple, recent information from a former scientist with the former Soviet Fisheries Ministry
reveals that between 1948 and 1973, the Soviet Union actually killed 48,477 humpback
whales,' not the 2,710 kills officially reported to the International Whaling Commission.
David Hearst, Soviet Files Hid Systematic Slaughter of World Whale Herds, THE GAZETTE
(Montreal), Feb. 12, 1994, at D9. See also infra notes 113-122 and accompanying text. Ste-
phen Palumbi, an expert on fisheries science, has remarked: "The ocean is a big, big place,
and when you're out of sight of land, no one will know what you do." Natalie Angier, DNA
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oceans may be the only truly "international" area on the planet, repre-
senting an expanse beyond the territorial boundaries of all nations
Historically, customary international law has provided that a sover-
eign state has jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its laws only within
its territorial borders. Nevertheless, because a large portion of the
Earth's surface is "open ocean,"8 there is plainly a need for the rule of
law to extend beyond traditional state borders. Various problems arise,
however, when a nation projects its laws extraterritorially. For example,
the United States, like other countries, has often asserted an expansive
view of the "extraterritorial reach of law,"9 but these assertions of extra-
territorial jurisdiction have occasionally resulted in conflicts with the
laws or policies of other nations."
The oceans present many unique challenges to the conservation of
living resources. Remarkably, there is a general paucity of scholars and
commentators that have addressed the problems associated with the
Tests Find Meat of Endangered Whales for Sale in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at C4
(quoting Professor Stephen Palumbi of the University of Hawaii).
7. The idea that the oceans are the common property of all can be traced to the Dutch
philosopher Hugo de Groot (Grotius) in the early 17th century. JAMES B. MORRELL, THE
LAW OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1982 TREATY AND ITS REJECTION BY
THE UNITED STATES 2 (1992); see also Derrick M. Kedziora, Gunboat Diplomacy in the
Northwest Atlantic: The 1995 Canada-EU Fishing Dispute and the United Nations Agree-
ment on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1132, 1134
(1997). In 1609, Grotius published a pamphlet entitled Mare Liberum, in which he argued:
The sea can in no way become the private property of any one, because nature not
only allows but enjoins its common use.... Nature does not give a right to any-
body to appropriate such things as may inoffensively be used by everybody and
are inexhaustible, and therefore, sufficient for all.
MORRELL, supra, at 2.
8. This article will use "open ocean" and "high seas" synonymously. These terms des-
ignate an area defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter 1982 LOS
Convention]. Under the 1982 LOS Convention, which is discussed in detail infra in Part
IV.B, a coastal state has jurisdiction over marine resources not only in its internal waters and
territorial sea (see id. at Art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272) but also within its Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) which extends up to a maximum of two hundred nautical miles from a state's
shore. Id. at art. 57, 21 I.L.M. at 1280. Accordingly, the "high seas" are defined as: "all parts
of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state." Id. at art. 86,
21 I.L.M. at 1286.
9. See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 67 (1992) ("The readiness of the United States to apply its laws
extraterritorially in post-War years provoked vigorous protests from affected foreign states
and private enterprises."); A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, The British
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); Najeeb Samie,
Extraterritorial Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws: The British Reaction, 16 INT'L
LAW. 313, 314 (1982).
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protection of the marine environment, particularly the role that moni-
toring and enforcement play in international environmental regimes."
Those that have lamented the dearth of monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms in international environmental agreements have often failed
to offer a comprehensive solution.
2
This article examines existing structures and mechanisms for the
enforcement of international environmental laws, particularly
international laws that must confront violations on the high seas in order
to protect marine organisms." Although the tenor of the present analysis
is general, many of the most influential international marine agreements
to date are highlighted, including the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea,14 the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-Operation
11. Although few commentators and scholars have examined the role that monitoring
and enforcement play in the protection of the environment, particularly the marine environ-
ment, the issue appears to be receiving increased attention. See, e.g., Steven M. Anderson,
Reforming International Institutions to Improve Global Environmental Relations, Agreement,
and Treaty Enforcement, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771 (1995); David D. Caron,
The International Whaling Commission and The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commis-
sion: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154
(1995); Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law: IV Assent to and En-
forcement of International Environmental Agreements, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1487, 1550
(1991) [hereinafter Assent and Enforcement]; Christopher C. Joyner, Recommended Meas-
ures Under the Antarctic Treaty: Hardening Compliance with Soft International Law 19
MICH. J. INT'L L. 401 (1998); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the Success of Inter-
national Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47 (1995); Kal Raustiala,
International "Enforcement Of Enforcement" Under the North American Agreement on En-
vironmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 721 (1996); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata,
Implementation, Enforcement, and Compliance With International Environmental Agree-
ments-Practical Suggestions in Light.of the World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 37 (1996); Andrew Watson Samaan, Enforcement of International Environmental
Treaties: An Analysis, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 261, 270 (1993).
12. A small number of scholars, however, have offered comprehensive solutions. See,
e.g., Anderson, supra note 11; O'Connell, supra note 11; Samaan, supra note 11; Shihata,
supra note 11; Catherine Tinker, Environmental Planet Management by the United Nations:
An Idea Whose ime Has Not Yet Come?, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 793 (1990).
13. The primary focus of this article is on the biotic components of the marine environ-
ment, particularly the conservation of fish and mammal populations. However, in recognition
of the connections between the biotic and abiotic components of the marine system, some
aspects of pollution control are also addressed. The reasons for this focus stem from both the
author's personal interest and from the fact that, unlike the paucity of scholarship on mam-
mal and fish conservation, there is considerable scholarship addressing international marine
pollution. See, e.g., David Driesen, The Congressional Role in International Environmental
Law and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 287
(1991); David A. Ring, Sustainability Dynamics: Land-Based Marine Pollution and Devel-
opment Priorities in the Island States of the Commonwealth Caribbean, 22 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 65 (1997); ROBERT A. SHINN, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MARINE
POLLUTION CONTROL (1974); Michael Twigg, Marine Species Protection and Pollution Pre-
vention, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 869 (1995).
14. Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Oct.
21, 1982, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.62/121, 21 I.L.M 1245.
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in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 5 and the United Nations Agreement
on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stock and
Highly Migratory Fish Stock. 6
Part I discusses the need for,. and development of, international envi-
ronmental laws protecting the marine environment. Part II outlines
many of the problems inherent in the enforcement of international envi-
ronmental agreements generally, and the additional problems of
extraterritorial -enforcement on the high seas. Part III highlights the
critical role that monitoring plays as the basis for an effective interna-
tional environmental regime and discusses the difficulty of monitoring
compliance over large spatial scales. Part IV canvasses and critiques
current enforcement structures and mechanisms in international envi-
ronmental agreements protecting the marine environment. Finally, Part
V argues that existing compliance mechanisms are insufficient to pro-
tect the marine environment and proposes a new apparatus that utilizes
non-governmental organizations as an aid in monitoring and compliance
under the auspices of an international compliance and monitoring
17
agency.
15. Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries,
opened for signature Oct. 24, 1978, art. 11(1), 1979 Canada Treaty Series No. 11, 3-4 (1979)
[hereinafter NAFO Convention].
16. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Conference on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.164/37 (1995), 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) [hereinafter Migratory Fish Stocks Agree-
ment].
Other agreements analyzed in some depth include the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 74
[hereinafter ICRW]; the Convention to Prohibit Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific, opened
for signature Nov. 29, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1449 (1990); the International Convention for the
High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 4 U.S.T
380; and the U.N. General Assembly Resolution establishing a moratorium on high seas
driftnet fishing, see G.A. Res. 44/225, Dec. 22, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1555 (1990).
17. The creation of an international compliance and monitoring agency may be particu-
larly timely in light of current reform efforts at the United Nations. Recently, Secretary
General Kofi Annan optimistically stated to the UN General Assembly:
Indeed, let this be known as the "reform Assembly." Let it be remembered as the
time when all of us joined forces and seized the opportunities created by the new
era to revitalize our United Nations-this unique and universal instrument for
concerted action in pursuit of the betterment of humankind.
September 22, 1997 Statement to the U.N. General Assembly, reprinted in M2 PRESSWIRE,
Sept. 23, 1997. Of course, not all responses have been positive. See generally Robert H.
Reid, U.S. Reform Proposal Has U.N. In Turmoil, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 26, 1997, at A15
(discussing controversy surrounding proposal to add new permanent members to the Security
Council). For a more scholarly analysis of potential UN reforms, see David Bills, Interna-
tional Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Ramifications of Reform on the
United Nations' Security Council, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 107 (1996); Tobi P. Dress, Goals of the
Winter 1998]
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I. THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
PROTECTING THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
Ecosystems and individual species do not respect political
boundaries. Consequently, international environmental agreements are
needed."8 To rely solely on the patchwork of national environmental
regulations would be both ineffective and inefficient.' 9 First, reliance on
national environmental initiatives is ineffective because most
environmental problems have transboundary characteristics. 20 In
addition, many environmental harms are spatially and temporally
United Nations Decade of International Law: Law Reform and National Programs, 87 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 357 (1993).
18. See, e.g., Cyrille de Klemm & Clare Shine, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY CONSERVATION
AND THE LAW: LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVING SPECIES AND ECOSYSTEMS 73 (1993)
(IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 29) [hereinafter IUCN Paper]. The envi-
ronment obviously obeys no jurisdictional limitations:
Jurisdictional separations, whether functional or territorial but particularly the lat-
ter, obey no ecological or biological logic. They are mostly political or
administrative. The effect of dividing populations and habitats by artificial juris-
dictional boundaries is often to make the rational conservation and management of
wild species very difficult.
Id. at 73. See Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, V Institutional
Arrangements, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1580, 1580 (1991) [hereinafter Institutional Arrange-
ments] ("States have recognized these problems as matters of living standards, security, and
even survival, and there is broad agreement that international action is the best, if not the
only, means to address them."); Tolba, Building an Environmental Institutional Framework
for the Future, 17 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 105, 107 (1990).
19. See generally Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11.
20. This argument takes two forms. First, environmental issues are never purely local
because of the interconnectedness of the biosphere. See, e.g., PG. Kurup, Environmental
Protection Act: A Scientist's View, 11 COCHIN U.L. REV. 12, 13 (1987) ("The earth, as a
whole, has one atmosphere. The global atmosphere cannot be divided into Indian, American
or Russian."). See generally Linda A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in
International Law Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203 (1987). Second, environmental issues are never purely local be-
cause of the interconnectedness of global commerce. As one U.S. government official has
remarked in the antitrust context:
Perhaps a strict territorial view of jurisdiction might have made sense when
American antitrust was in its infancy, but both times and the law have changed.
Technological innovation has almost literally made the world smaller, facilitating
transportation and communication which expand beyond imagination the possibil-
ity of world trade. The multinational corporation and other new areas of business
organization have tied the world into a largely interdependent economy.
John H. Shenefield, Address Before the American Bar Association, Section of International
Law (Aug. 9, 1978), in MARIAN LLOYD NASH, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1345-46 (1978). In the environmental context, for example, pesticides
that have been banned in the United States but sold abroad can return on food imports. See
Karen A. Goldberg, Comment, Efforts to Prevent Misuse of Pesticides Exported to Develop-
ing Countries: Progressing Beyond Regulation and Notification, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1025,
1028-29 (1985).
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diffuse.2 Therefore, the impacts on individual states may not be
sufficient to justify unilateral action."
Second, reliance solely on national environmental regulation is
inefficient. Due to the operation of competitive international markets,
the existence of less protective environmental regimes may undermine
the willingness of a State to enact comparatively stricter environmental
standards. 23 For example, "[g]lobal environmental resources, such as
rain forests, that lie within the territory of a state that provides little
environmental protection may be unnecessarily squandered; meanwhile,
increased environmental protection in one country may simply drive
polluting industries to other nations."24 In the end, because resource
21. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245 (1968).
In addition:
[S]erious environmental harms, such as the ozone hole or degradation of the
Chesapeake Bay, often arise from many small, seemingly safe uses of property
that only together cause great harm. Environmental protection began with judge-
make law, but shifted to legislative statutes long ago precisely because courts have
difficulty recognizing and regulating such diffuse sources of harm.
Timothy D. Searchinger, Private Property Rights and Environmental Harm, EDF Letter (A
Report to Members of the Environmental Defense Fund), Oct. 1992, at 4 (quoted in David S.
Ardia, Dolan v. City of igard: Takings Doctrine Moves onto Unpaved Ground, 24 REAL
ESTATE L.J. 195, 232 (1996)).
Finally, because environmental benefits and harms span generations, traditional cost-
benefit analysis undervalues environmental initiatives. See Page, Economics of a Throwaway
Society; The One-Way Economy, in ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES POLICY 74, 78-82 (J. But-
lin ed., 1981); see also Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary Trust: Conservation and
Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495,516-19 (1984).
22. See Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1550-51 ("[S]tates may underesti-
mate environmental problems and conclude that negotiating or assenting to agreements is too
costly."); cf. Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and The American Law of Nuisance, Past, Present, and
Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 229-30 (1990) ("[N]uisance law could not adequately respond
to the problems of air and water pollution. Informational, procedural, and financial barriers
would preclude many affected parties from bringing suit against pervasive nuisances with
widespread impact on the general public health and welfare.").
23. See generally Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law: VI. Ex-
traterritorial Environmental Regulation, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1609 (1991) [hereinafter
Extraterritorial Regulation].
24. Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1550. But see Richard B. Stewart, Envi-
ronmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993).
Professor Stewart argues:
The empirical studies on productivity, trade, and industrial location are broadly
consistent with one another. They show that national differences in environmental
regulation have had an important impact at the margin in the case of a relatively
few "dirty" industries. There is also evidence of a more general shift in the loca-
tion of heavy industrial and chemical facilities and trade advantage in those
sectors to developing countries.... [However,] the studies do not show that envi-
ronmental requirements are a dominant factor in overall international
competitiveness.
Id. at 2084 (footnotes omitted).
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extractors subject to stricter environmental regulation will have higher
costs than their counterparts in a country with weaker regulations,
domestic political pressure to relax standards may result in a race to the
bottom of the "environmental ladder."5
Nevertheless, prior to 1972, members of the United Nations passed
few international environmental agreements.26 In 1972, members signed
a declaration committing the United Nations to environmental issues.7
The international community has subsequently enacted a number of
multilateral and bilateral conventions that deal with environmental is-
sues; 162 multilateral treaties and protocols on the environment are
listed in the United Nations Environment Programme's 1993 register,2
an increase from 102 in 1980.29
However, the sheer number of environmental agreements masks a
disturbing situation. Few international environmental agreements con-
tain substantive commitments by the parties." Furthermore, in the few
25. See Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 23, at 1617; see also Raymond J. Kopp
et al., Comparing environmental regulation in the OECD countries, RESOURCES, Fall 1990,
at 10, 13 (positing that strict U.S. hazardous waste standards may reduce U.S. competitive-
ness); Sanchez, Health and Environmental Risks of the Maquiladora in Mexicali, 30 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 163, 185 (1990) (observing that many U.S. firms have fled California to take
advantage of the relaxed environmental standards in Mexico).
26. See Jennifer K. Rankin, Note, U.S. Laws in the Rainforest: Can a U.S. Court Find
Liability for Extraterritorial Pollution Caused by a U.S. Corporation? An Analysis of
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1995). An important excep-
tion during this period is the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling signed
in 1946. See infra Part IV.
27. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
June 5-16, 1972, 27th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 (1972).
28. U.N. Environment Programme, Register of International Treaties and Other Agree-
ments in the Field of the Environment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC15/INF4 (1993).
29. U.N. Environment Programme, Register of International Treaties and Other Agree-
ments in the Field of the Environment, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/INFORMATION/11/Rev. 1
(1985) (listing 140 multilateral treaties and protocols on the environment). See also EN-
VIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 482-90 app. B (Edith Brown Weiss ed.,
1992) (finding that from 1972 to 1979 at least 35 treaties were signed); THE MARINE
MAMMAL COMMISSION COMPENDIUM OF SELECTED TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER RELEVANT DOCUMENTS ON MARINE RESOURCES, WILDLIFE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (Richard L. Wallace ed., 1994).
30. For example, the recent United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity contains
lofty objectives, yet postpones for further consideration the issues of liability and redress for
activities affecting the marine environment. United Nations Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity
Convention]. As one commentator has remarked:
There is no specific language in the Biodiversity Convention's text to obligate
parties to bear the costs of avoiding activities that might threaten or damage biodi-
versity in marine ecosystems. Moreover, the Biodiversity Convention does not
obligate a party either to avoid or minimize threats or damage to biodiversity be-
yond the limits of its national jurisdiction (i.e., on the high seas).... The
Convention's failure to include these provisions is especially regrettable because it
[Vol. 19:497
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agreements that contain substantive commitments there is a startling
absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms." International
cooperation in the areas of monitoring and enforcement is crucial in or-
der to make the formation of environmental laws and subsequent rights
meaningful." The lack of a "centralized supranational regulatory
authority," moreover, is often cited as the critical barrier to effective en-
vironmental protection.3 For example, in preparation for the 1972
United Nations' Stockholm Conference, then UN Secretary General U.
Thant proposed a new "global authority," "a legislative body capable of
establishing binding standards.., and an enforcement authority with
power to make conclusive determinations as to compliance."35
The acute need for an effective monitoring and enforcement regime
is particularly compelling in the context of the marine environment. The
world's oceans are important to many nations for purposes as diverse as
commerce, transportation, minerals, food, survival, and, more recently,
as a repository for human pollution and waste. 6 Recent research
deprives the instrument of the regulatory means necessary to control parties whose
nationals violate norms associated with the preservation of marine biodiversity.
Christopher C. Joyner, Biodiversity in the Marine Environment: Resource Implications for
the Law of the Sea, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 650 (1995) [hereinafter Joyner, Biodi-
versity].
31. See Samaan, supra note 11, at 270 ("What little international environmental law ex-
ists is often ineffective because of the absence of enforcement mechanisms."); see also
Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 23, at 1609 ("The body of customary norms and
international agreements that comprise the public international legal.system do not provide
comprehensive environmental protection."); Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 686 ("the
preeminent critical factor remains implementation and enforcement"); see also discussion
infra in Part IV.
32. See, e.g., R.D. MUNRO & J.G. LAMMERS, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1987); Joyner,
Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 686 ("There is a critical need for prudent international plan-
ning and coordinated management that will insure the continued vitality and survival of these
valuable marine ecosystems."). See also discussion infra Parts III and IV.
33. See, e.g., Gray, The U.N. Development Programme: An Assessment, 20 ENVTL. L.
291, 317-18 (1990); Greenberg, IMCO: An Environmentalist's Perspective, 8 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 131, 144 (1976); Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1590; Tolba, supra
note 18, at 109.
34. 8 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS 350 (A.
Cordier & M. Harrelson eds., 1977).
35. Chayes, International Institutions for the Environment, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS, AND
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 1, 2 (J. Hargrove ed., 1972) (paraphrasing U. Thant).
36. Although income generated from fishing comprises only a small portion of the
global economy, fishing is oftentimes the lifeblood of coastal and island regions. In South-
east Asia, more than five million people fish full time, contributing approximately $6.6
billion towards the region's economy. Peter Weber, Protecting Oceanic Fisheries and Jobs,
in STATE OF THE WORLD 1995, at 23 (citing Mohd Ibrahim Hj Mohamed, National Manage-
ment of Malaysian Fisheries, MARINE POLICY, January 1991, at 2-14). In northern Chile,
fishing accounted for 40 percent of income, 18,000 jobs, and $400 million worth of exports
in 1990. Id. at 23 (citing Leslie Crawford, Chile No Longer has Plenty More Fish in the Sea,
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suggests that the oceans contain animal life that rivals tropical forests in
its diversity of species. 7 As Professor G. Carlton Ray of the Department
of Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia writes, "the
coastal zone may be the single most important portion of our planet.
The loss of its biodiversity may have repercussions far beyond our worst
fears.""
Although conflict between nations over the navigational use of the
oceans dates back thousands of years, conflict over the ocean's natural
resources is a relatively recent phenomenon. Historically, the biotic and
abiotic resources found beyond the coastlines and an approximately two
to three mile "territorial zone" were considered common property. 9
However, humankind's bucolic relationship with the sea is changing-or
at least our perception of the ocean's abundance is becoming more tem-
pered. Current conflicts between human resource needs and the marine
environment are largely an outgrowth of the industrialization of modem
fishing and whaling practices.40 Once perceived as boundless, the marine
environment is now seen as limited and fragile. "What one nation does
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 19, 1991). In Iceland, fishing accounts for 17 percent of the national
income and 12-13 percent of employment. Id. at 23.
37. For example, of the world's seventy-one phyla, forty-three (61%) are marine organ-
isms, while only twenty-eight are land organisms. G. CARLTON RAY, Ecological Diversity in
Coastal Zones and Oceans, in BIODIVERSrrY 38-39 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
38. Id. at 48.
39. See Robert B. Krueger & Myron H. Nordquist, The Evolution of the 200-Mile Ex-
clusive Economic Zone: State Practice in the Pacific Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 321, 322
(1979). Hugo Grotius relied on the idea of an inexhaustible resource as the basis of his con-
cept of mare liberum, stating that, "[t]he sea can in no way become the private property of
any one .... Nature does not give a right to anybody to appropriate such things as may inof-
fensively be used by everybody and are inexhaustible, and therefore, sufficient for all."
MORRELL, supra note 7, at 2, quoting HUGO GROTIUs, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (Ralph
van Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1916) (1633) (emphasis added).
40. See generally CHARLES A.S. HALL ET AL., ENERGY & RESOURCE QUALITY: THE
ECOLOGY OF THE ECONOMIC PROCESS, 437-446 (1992) stating:
Modem fossil fuel-intensive fisheries in Europe evolved from the steam tugs that
once pulled wind-powered fishing boats out of North Sea ports during calm
weather.... From these relatively humble beginnings evolved today's modem
fishing fleet, which is very capital and energy intensive. Commercial fishing is
normally done with nets, dredges, or traps of some kind or with long strings of
baited fishhooks. Fossil energy is used to build gear and boats, travel to and from
fishing grounds, tow nets, and preserve the catch. Many high seas fishing boats
weigh about the same when they leave port as when they return, the weight of fuel
used being roughly equal to the weight of fish brought back.
Id. at 437. See also Christopher C. Joyner, Ocean Fisheries, U.S. Interests, and the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 749, 749-50 (1995) [hereinafter Joyner,
The 1982 LOS Convention] ("Rapid advancement in detection technologies and fishing tech-
niques-especially remote sensing, satellite imaging, monofilament driftnets, purse seining,
and long line fisheries-has meant increasingly efficient exploitation of the living resources
of the seas.").
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in its exploitation of the high seas has consequences that impact every
other nation that utilizes marine resources."'
What is happening in the world's oceans is startling. The over-
exploitation of marine organisms has "led to accelerated quantitative,
genetic, and social disruptions of numerous fish, shellfish, turtle, and
mammal species., 42 For example, overfishing (and a change in weather
patterns) decimated the anchovy fishery off Peru in the 1960s43 and
nearly depleted the cod and mackerel stocks in the Southern Ocean.'
This over-exploitation extends to most species and to all regions of the
world's oceans.45 In fact, modern whaling has brought many species to
the brink of extinction." By 1930, nearly 30,000 blue whales were being
killed each year, and it is estimated that 330,000 had been killed by
1966. 47 Current estimates place the population of North Atlantic right
whales at no more than 300 individuals. 48 Before whale hunting began,
41. Jane Kathryn Jenkins, International Regulation of Driftnet Fishing: The Role of En-
vironmental Activism and Leverage Diplomacy, 4 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 197, 198-99
(1993).
42. Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 642. A July 19, 1996 report from the Fisher-
ies and Agriculture Organization to the Secretary General of the United Nations summarized
the present situation as follows:
Conservation and management of fisheries resources worldwide is generally in a
poor state. There have been no major improvements in the situation since FAO re-
ported in the early 1990s that approximately 70 per cent of the world's marine
capture fisheries for which data were available were fully exploited, over-
exploited or in a state of recovery.
Report of the Secretary General, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 24(b), at 6, U.N. Doc. A/51/383
(1996).
43. See Boyce Thorne-Miller & John G. Catena, THE LIVING OCEAN: UNDERSTANDING
AND PROTECTING MARINE BIODIVERSITY 20 (1991).
44. See Karl-Hermann Kock, Fishing and Conservation in Southern Waters, 30 POLAR
RECORD 12-14 (1994).
45. In the Bering Sea alone, nearly two hundred California gray whales were killed by
Russian whalers in 1991. SEA SHEPHERD LOG, Autumn 1991, at 1 (on file with author).
Every night, Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese boats place 35,000 miles of drift net, forty
miles long and thirty feet deep, entangling and suffocating an estimated 150,000 sea mam-
mals (including dolphins, whales, and seals) and a million seabirds each year. Charles
Bowden, At Sea with the Shepherd, BUZZWORM, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 38, 41. See discussion
infra note 113 and accompanying text. In addition, the three top sealing nations (Canada,
Russia, and Norway) killed 135,000 seals in 1991 alone. BUZZWORM, supra, at 41.
46. "[T]he history of whaling has seen overfishing of one area after another and of one
species of whale after another to such a degree that it is essential to protect all species of
whales from further overfishing." International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
Preamble, Dec. 2,1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, 74.
47. GEOFFREY LEAN ET AL., ATLAS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 161 (1990).
48. Eric Niiler, Population of Right Whales Up Slightly, PATRIOT LEDGER, Oct. 30,
1996, at *1, available in 1996 WL 8061870; see also New Data Shows Whale Populations
Critically Low, Says World Wildlife Fund, Bus. WIRE, June 12, 1989, available in 1989 WL
BW190 [hereinafter Whaling Populations] (estimating the population of blue whales at 200
to 1,100 individuals).
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the finback whale population was believed to be 500,000; recent reports
estimate that only 4,000 finback whales are alive in the Southern Hemi-
sphere.49
The problems of over-exploitation are exacerbated by the fact that
most domestic and international environmental laws lack effective
mechanisms to monitor and enforce protections, particularly on the
"high seas" where the oceans are common territory outside the jurisdic-
tion of any particular State. This is a classic manifestation of Garrett
Hardin's famous tale of The Tragedy of the Commons: "Ruin is the des-
tination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest
in a society which believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in
a commons brings ruin to all."50
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
It is an axiomatic principle of international law that sovereign states
may bind themselves through international agreements. Furthermore,
the central precept of pacta sunt servanda requires that States obey their
international commitments in good faith.5 However, by committing to
an international regulatory regime a State necessarily relinquishes some
of its inherent sovereignty. As expected, sovereignty is often an agoniz-
ing possession for a State to give up. "States often vigorously defend
their sovereignty because they consider their physical integrity and po-
litical identity as important elements in their foreign policies."52
A. The Enforcement Of Environmental Agreements Generally
The tension between state sovereignty and the need for international
environmental initiatives is often a significant barrier to both
49. Whaling Populations, supra note 48. As blue whales became scarce, whalers moved
their sights to finback whales; in the 1950s, whalers killed finbacks. LEAN ET AL., supra note
47, at 161. In the 1960s the preferred prey was sei whales; in the 1970s, it was minke whales.
Id. at 161. By 1975 an estimated 1.5 million whales had been killed through whaling. Id. at
161.
50. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, reprinted in ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY,
AND ETHICS 104 (H. Daly ed., 1973); see also Cyrille de Klemm, Migratory Species in In-
ternational Law, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 935, 938 (1989) ("Conversely, where no State has
sovereign rights, that is to say in the high seas, animals become international res nullius that
anybody may exploit, over-exploit or destroy as he pleases. This latter principle is embodied
in international law under the name of freedom of fishing in the high seas.').
51. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339 ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be per-
formed by them in good faith.").
52. Samaan, supra note 11, at 271 (citing KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTER-
NATIONAL POLITICS (1979)).
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environmental enforcement and to the creation of international
environmental agreements in the first place. Although the capacity to
unilaterally withdraw, either legally53 or clandestinely, may increase the
likelihood that a State will agree to an international norm, this power
can seriously undermine the enforcement and effectiveness of
environmental initiatives.54 In addition, States will often require as a
condition of their ratification that the collective action of multiple
parties be required to implement and enforce the agreement. Inevitably,
these "international bureaucracies" further increase the opportunities for
unilateral withdrawal.5 It should thus not be surprising that there is a
growing number of unenforced, uncoordinated international
environmental agreements 6
53. The ability of a party state to "opt out" or withdraw is a common provision in envi-
ronmental treaties. See, e.g., ICRW, supra note 16, at art. 5; Convention on Future
Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries, art. 12(2)(b), available in Int'l
Envtl. L., WL 154036 (1981) (outlining opt-out provisions); Protocol Amending Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts to Provide
for EEC Membership, Nov. 11, 1982, art. XI(4)(a)-(b), 22 I.L.M. 704 (clarifying opt out
provisions of the 1973 Gdansk Convention); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the
Ozone Layer, Mar. 22 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11097; Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art. 19, 26 I.L.M. 1550. See generally ELLEN HEY,
THE REGIME FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY MARINE FISHERIES RESOURCES
225-30 (1989) (discussing the structure, organization and opt-out procedures of the Interna-
tional Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas).
54. The primary argument against "opt out" provisions rests on the need for uniformity,
an essential component of environmental regimes. See generally Eric J. Pan, Authoritative
Interpretation of Agreements: Developing More Responsive International Administrative
Regimes, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503 (1997). Pan argues that:
The opt-out system is an unrealistic mechanism because it undermines a regime's
goal of developing regulatory uniformity. It forces the contracting parties effec-
tively to become members of separate agreements because over time, as parties
exercise their right to opt out of various amendments, different parties will end up
having different legal obligations to the regime.
Id. at 509 (citation omitted). See also Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1608
("opt-out procedures may jeopardize the overall effectiveness of a standard: depending on
the topic, regulations can be undermined if a small minority of states with disproportional
impact on the issue opts out"); Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1553
("International law and international agreements ... are undermined if states withdraw clan-
destinely."); Colin W. Clark, Economic Biases Against Sustainable Development, in
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 319, 328
(R. Costanza ed., 1991) ("For the quota system to succeed it must be rigorously enforced,
since cheating on quotas would be highly profitable."). See also infra notes 108-113 dis-
cussing the detrimental effects of unilateral withdrawal.
55. See Samaan, supra note 11, at 271 ("Since states are sovereign and are free to
choose as they will, they often rely on collective action to implement and monitor treaties.
This further increases the chances of unilateral withdrawal.").
56. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 776-77, 805 ("[M]any of the agreements signed in
recent years have not been effectively implemented or enforced."); see also Joyner, The 1982
LOS Convention, supra note 40, at 762 n.46 ("The chief conservation and management
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Because most multilateral environmental agreements are only mor-
ally binding, the success of each agreement depends upon the
willingness of countries to abide by the provisions they have agreed to
and to enforce compliance among their citizens 7 Thus, the effective-
ness of international environmental initiatives hinges on voluntary
compliance; governments determine for themselves whether they are in
compliance." Whether as a result of changing domestic politics or eco-
nomic conditions, treaty commitments can become burdensome on party
states. Inevitably, when a particular commitment becomes contrary to a
State's interests--either sociopolitical or economic-it is less likely that
the commitment will be honored. 9
In light of such compelling reasons to strengthen international
monitoring and enforcement regimes, why has the international com-
munity failed to act? The failure can be attributed to a number of
factors. First, "positivist notions of international law require that states
be bound only when they have given their express or tacit consent to be
the subject of an international right or obligation."0 As previously
noted, state sovereignty must necessarily prevail over the needs of the
international community even where that sovereignty puts the world
community at risk or is contrary to a clear majority of the world's citi-
61zens.
problem associated with highly migratory species is the lack of enforceable regulatory bod-
ies.").
57. The willingness of a party state to implement its international obligations is by no
means assured. See Michael S. Giaimo, Deforestation in Brazil: Domestic Political Impera-
tive-Global Ecological Disaster, 18 ENVTL. L. 537 (1988). Shihata notes:
Contrary to theoretical assumptions ... states do not take all rules of international
law with the same degree of seriousness, either in their adoption or in their imple-
mentation. Treaties that entail financial obligations or that relate to the state's
territory are discussed with utmost care by the officials concerned in all relevant
ministries and are often subject to parliamentary approval. Once they are ap-
proved, these treaties are usually honored in practice. By contrast, multilateral
conventions concerning the environment, much like human rights conventions,
have been left in many countries to foreign affairs officials who may be more con-
cerned with the public image of their state if it questioned or rejected the rules,
rather than about the actual prospects of their application.
Shihata, supra note 11, at 39.
58. See Sanford E. Gaines, Global and Regional Perspectives on International Environ-
mental Protection, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 983, 997-98 (1997) ("With weak international
administrative capacity, the effectiveness of the regime depends on the capacity of each of
the participating governments to implement and enforce the appropriate domestic measures
to give effect to the agreement."); Samaan, supra note 11, at 273.
59. For an extensive discussion of past violations of international marine agreements,
see infra notes 104-122 and accompanying text.
60. Anderson, supra note 11, at 778.
61. See Phillippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 399 (1989) ("Until international law moves away from the view that
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Second, international agreements ordinarily go through demanding
domestic ratification processes and, because many are not self-
executing, require domestic implementing legislation before they can be
enforced.62 Even treaties that are considered self-executing often require
tacit domestic approval in order to obtain the funding required for im-
plementation.63 Furthermore, the act of signing a treaty entails little
actual obligation on the signatory state; not only does signing a treaty
fail to obligate the State, in many instances it does not even require a
signatory state to undertake its own ratification process or to deposit a
ratified treaty with the appropriate international body." Many States that
sign international environmental agreements either fail to enact any im-
plementing legislation or "draft ill-conceived and poorly structured
domestic legislation,"65 leaving the agreements as virtual "dead letters."66
Third, most international environmental regimes are structurally in-
capable of providing the necessary monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. Indeed, "international environmental treaties often lack
domestic enforcement mechanisms precisely because environmental
agreements are put into effect by secretariats, international organiza-
tions, and other international bodies that lack 'international
international society comprises a community of states, and comes to encompass the persons
(both legal and natural) within those states, it will not be able to provide even the most ele-
mentary framework for the protection of the environment.").
62. FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL
SE1rING 280 (2d ed. 1993). In the United States, for example, the U.S. Constitution provides
that the President has power to make treaties only "by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate ... " U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
63. See Roger W. Findley, The Incorporation of International Environmental Treaty Law
into National Law in a Federal System: Problems, Obstacles and Solutions, in DROIT DE
L'ENVIRONNEMENT ET DtVELOPPEMENT DURABLE 25, 30-31 (1994).
64. For example, Kirgis found that:
There is normally no obligation on governments... to submit signed conventions
to any domestic approval or ratification process. (Thus, in the case of the United
States, there would normally be no international obligation to submit such a...
convention to the Senate for its advice and consent or to Congress for legislative
approval). Moreover, even if such a convention is approved by the domestic proc-
ess, the state is not normally under any international obligation to ratify it. That is,
it does not have to take the final step of signifying to the other signatories or par-
ties its intention to be bound. If it does not ratify such a convention, it is not bound
by it.
KIRGIS, supra note 62, at 280.
65. Anderson, supra note 11, at 778.
66. Andronico 0. Adede, Lessons from Twenty Years of International Law-making in the
Field of the Environment 1972-1992, in A LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 11, 16 (Alexandre
Kiss & Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin eds., 1994). See Shihata, supra note 11, at 39.
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jurisdiction.' ,,7 Most environmental agreements establish an organiza-
tional structure consisting of a plenary body of representatives from
each signatory country, a smaller body that meets in order to perform
treaty functions, and a secretariat. 6' The majority of the monitoring and
enforcement work logically falls on the treaty secretariat who is typi-
cally responsible for implementation. 9 However, "[i]mplementing and
enforcing international environmental treaties is especially burdensome
for secretariats because their duties are not always precisely defined,
budgets are limited, and many treaties are not self-executing. 7° Conse-
quently, many secretariats cannot effectively implement their own
treaties without substantial assistance from other international organiza-
tions and from party states themselves.71
Finally, many countries, particularly developing countries, lack the
financial and technological capacity to meaningfully enforce environ-
mental regulations. 7' Add to this financial constraint the inevitable
67. Anderson, supra note 11, at 779. See also Findley, supra note 63, at 25; cf. Anthony
Clark Arend, The United Nations and the New World Order, 81 GEo. L.J. 491, 496-97
(1993) (discussing jurisdiction of the UN Security Council).
68. See KIRGIS, supra note 62, at 274-75. For example, the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) contains an Assembly, Council and Secretariat. The Council is composed
of sixteen contracting parties-twelve selected by their interest in providing international
shipping services and four elected by nations interested in using international 'shipping serv-
ices. See KENNETH R. SIMMONDS, THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 5-9
(1994). Other environmental agreements that utilize this organizational structure include the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, UNEP Doc. IG.53/5, 26 I.L.M.
1529 (1987); the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 16; the
Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, opened
for signature Oct. 24, 1978, art. II(1), Canada Treaty Series No. 11, 3-4 (1979).
69. KIRGIS, supra note 62, at 274-75. Secretariats, however, are frequently not capable
of performing their assigned tasks:
Conventions' secretariats are seen by many as more technical, less political, and
less bureaucratic than full-fledged international organizations. Nonetheless, they
lack the capacity to enforce the conventions' obligations. Even their power to ver-
ify implementation is limited and can be hampered in the absence of the parties'
cooperation, especially in view of the fragmentation of state institutions dealing
with environmental issues and the large number of enterprises affecting the envi-
ronment.
Shihata, supra note 11, at 42-43.
70. Anderson, supra note 11, at 780.
71. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 780-81. Secretariats frequently interact with United
Nations agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); Samaan, supra note 11, at 261-70; Shi-
hata, supra note 11, at 42-43. See Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 259-61 (1992).
72. See, e.g., Karen A. Goldberg, Comment, Efforts to Prevent Misuse of Pesticides Ex-
ported to Developing Countries: Progressing Beyond Regulation and Notification, 12
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1025, 1030 (1985) ("The entire staff of a ministry of agriculture in a devel-
oping country may consist of only one or two people with 'nothing but a motorcycle and no
fuel.' ") (quoting an interview with L. Caltagirone, Professor of Entomology at the Center for
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political pressure that will come from domestic firms adversely affected
by the actual implementation and enforcement of the regulations, and
there often exists a strong incentive for governments to devote ever di-
minishing resources to monitoring and enforcement activities.73
B. Problems Associated with Extraterritorial Enforcement
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a form of jurisdiction under which one
sovereign claims the right to regulate activities outside its sovereign
boundaries.74 Not surprisingly, States are often reluctant to extend their
power beyond their recognized international borders.75 This is not to say,
however, that States are powerless beyond their sovereign borders. Since
World War II, the United States, like other countries,76 has often asserted
an expansive view of the "extraterritorial reach of law." Examples
include the application of U.S. export control laws to foreign
Biological Control, University of California, Berkeley and Advisor to USAID in Central
America (May 11, 1984)); Brad Knickerbocker, World Opens Eyes to Environment,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 23, 1990, at 6 (noting that "India's environmental agency
has just two lawyers to track lawbreakers"); T.M. Sen, Environment Planning for Industry in
the Developing Countries, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW. 55, 55-56 (1983) (comparing the relative
effectiveness of different countries' regulatory agencies).
73. See, e.g., R. Jaganmohen Rao & Sumitra, A Critique of the Environment Act, 11
COCHIN U.L. REV. 18, 25, 31-32 (1987) (noting that although India's new environmental
protection legislation is strict in certain respects, the government failed to delegate enforce-
ment to an effective agency).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987). Extraterritorial
jurisdiction is typically divided into legislative (or prescriptive jurisdiction), judicial juris-
diction, and enforcement jurisdiction. Legislative jurisdiction is a nation's power "to make its
law applicable to the activities, relations or status of persons.' Id. § 401(a). Judicial jurisdic-
tion is commonly described as a nation's authority "to subject persons or things to the
process of its courts or administrative tribunals." Id. § 401(b). Finally, enforcement jurisdic-
tion is defined as a State's power "to induce or compel compliance.., with its laws or
regulations." Id. § 401(c).
75. A recent example is the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of
1996, more commonly referred to as the Helms-Burton Act, which was signed into law by
President Clinton on March 12, 1996. As a result of vocal opposition from U.S. allies, Presi-
dent Clinton has been reluctant to apply the law's extraterritorial sanctions. See generally
Evelyn F. Cohn & Alan D. Berlin, European Community Reacts to Helms-Burton, N.Y. LAW
JOURNAL, Aug. 4, 1997, at S2.
76. See, e.g., Born, supra note 10, at 67 ("Other nations have increasingly abandoned
territorial limits on their legislation in the post-War years."). For example, German competi-
tion laws extend beyond German territory. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen [Law
against Restraints on Competition] § 98(2) (1977) (F.R.G.) ("This law shall apply to all re-
straints on competition that have effects within the territory which this Law applies, even if
such effects are caused by actions taken outside such territory."). Similarly, the European
Community's Treaty of Rome applies extraterritorially. See Theofanis Christoforou & David
B. Rockwell, Recent Developments, European Economic Community Law: The Territorial
Scope of Application of EEC Antitrust Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 195 (1989).
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subsidiaries of U.S. corporations; 77 U.S. antifraud provisions to foreign
firms' securities; 7' antitrust law applied to activities abroad with
intended effects on U.S. commerce; 79 economic sanctions against
overseas branches of U.S. financial institutions;' ° and Jones Act
damages for U.S. seaman injured on foreign vessels."
For the most part, scholars and commentators have examined
extraterritoriality under the rubric of a traditional conflict of laws
analysis. 2 This should not be surprising; if one State exercises
jurisdiction beyond its borders, it follows that the assertion of
jurisdiction impinges on the sovereignty of another State. 3 Naturally,
77. Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 2410-2420 (West 1993) (authorizing
controls over goods "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any per-
son subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" in circumstances involving "national
security").
78. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(17) (1994). See Born, supra note 10, at
45 ("U.S. lower courts have rejected any strict territorial limits in defining the reach of the
federal securities laws.").
79. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 20 (1995); see also U.S. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504,
511 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (applying antitrust laws against a foreign company).
80. See generally Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sub-
sidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 319
(1983).
81. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1994) ("Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the
course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law."). See
also Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding extrater-
ritorial reach of Jones Act).
82. Although the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction is distinct from a traditional
conflict of laws analysis, the two are often considered together. See Rankin, supra note 26, at
223 n.19, citing ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
REGULATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 515-83 (1991)).
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law recognizes extraterritorial jurisdiction as
being based on several principles: the territorial principle, the effects principle, the national-
ity principle, the passive personality principle, and the protective principle. § 402, cmts. c-g.
For commentary, see Eleanor J. Fox, Extraterritoriality, Antitrust, and the New Restatement:
Is Reasonableness the Answer?, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 565 (1987); Harold G. Maier,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
International Law, 76 AM J. INT'L L. 280 (1982); Karl M. Meessen, Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Under the New Restatement, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 47. Interna-
tional law most commonly recognizes the territorial and nationality principles as
justifications for extraterritorial jurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 402, cmt. A (1987). Although the methods of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction
are analyzed infra in Part V, a full discussion of the doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
beyond the scope of this article. See generally Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 23;
Born, supra note 10; Rankin, supra note 26; Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multina-
tional Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598
(1990).
83. See Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 23, at 1624 ("Cases involving extrater-
ritorial adjudication and legislation inevitably raise conflicts between competing policy
interests.").
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where two sovereigns' laws are potentially applicable, the
appropriateness of extraterritorial jurisdiction necessitates a conflict of
laws analysis in order to resolve the conflict between sovereigns.
However, this tension does not exist where the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is in an area where no other sovereign can, or
does, claim jurisdiction. This is precisely the case on the high seas
where many international marine laws must be enforced.'
C. The Marine Environment
Jurisdiction over the marine environment ostensibly is governed by
the Law of the Sea Convention." A coastal state has jurisdiction over
marine resources not only in its internal waters and territorial sea,s6 but
also within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends up to a
maximum of two hundred nautical miles from a nation's shore. 7 How-
ever, under existing international law no State has jurisdiction over
marine resources found in the high seas beyond the EEZ.8 Therefore,
navigation, fishing, and other activities cannot be entirely restricted be-
yond a two hundred nautical mile boundary. This raises important
concerns, many of which are highlighted in this article. As one expert in
the field has noted:
84. The importance of this observation is discussed infra in Parts IV and V.
85. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, 21 I.L.M. at 1271. Cyrille de Klemm and Clare
Shine note:
The present Law of the Sea Convention was signed in Montego Bay in December
1982 after approximately ten years of negotiations. The Convention... is excep-
tionally broad in scope. It defines, inter alia, the boundaries of each part of the sea
and the continental shelf and the legal regime applicable therein; the rights and
conditions of passage for shipping through other State's waters; jurisdiction over
ships on the high seas and exceptions to the principle of the freedom of the high
seas; and the legal and management regime for the exploitation of mineral re-
sources on the deep sea-bed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction.
Cyrille de Klemm & Clare Shine, Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law: Legal
Mechanisms for Conserving Species and Ecosystems 15 (1993) (IUCN Environmental Policy
and Law Paper No. 29) [hereinafter IUCN Paper].
86. The 1982 LOS Convention allows a coastal state to define the precise limits of its
"territorial sea." See 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272 ("Every
State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12
nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention.").
87. 1982 LOS Convention, art. 57, supra note 8, 21 I.L.M. at 1279. The breadth of the
exclusive economic zone is defined as follows: "The exclusive economic zone shall not ex-
tend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured." Id.
88. IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 72. However, pursuant to the Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf of 1958, coastal states retain sovereign rights over sedentary species
"in constant physical contact with" the continental shelf, even when that jurisdiction extends
beyond the outer limit of the EEZ. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471,499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
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[W]here no State has sovereign rights, that is to say in the high
seas, animals become international res nullius that anybody may
exploit, over-exploit or destroy as he pleases. This latter princi-
ple is embodied in international law under the name of freedom
of fishing in the high seas."
Nevertheless, it is possible for a State to regulate the activities of its
own nationals or ships outside its EEZ. For example, Italy has adopted a
decree empowering the minister in charge of fisheries to designate areas
in the open ocean where fishing by Italian vessels is prohibited.90 How-
ever, unilateral action by individual states provides little solace because
fishermen of other countries are not affected by the Italian order. To be
meaningful, fishing restrictions in a particular area of the high seas must
be adopted and enforced by all nations fishing in that area.9' Otherwise,
other less environmentally responsible nations will simply fill the void
left by the banned fisherman. Thus, all relevant States must agree to
both a norm and its enforcement. Because of economic and political
pressures it is unlikely that States will individually enforce limits on
their own domestic fishing and whaling fleets.92 Effective control of
fishing and whaling activity on the high seas can only be achieved
through enforceable international agreements.
93
89. De Klemm, supra note 50, at 938.
90. IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 160. An area in the vicinity of the island of
Lampedusa has been designated under this prohibition. Id. at 160.
91. Concern for this reality has been reflected in many coastal states' "jurisdiction
creeping" seaward. See Joyner, The 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 40, at 756 ("The his-
tory of ocean law in the second half of this century has been that of 'jurisdiction creeping'
seaward, from three miles, to twelve miles, to 200 miles."); see generally Barbara
Kwiatkowska, Creeping Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles in Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention and State Practice, 22 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 153 (1991); Christopher C. Joy-
ner & Peter N. Decola, Chile's Presential Sea Proposal: Implications for Straddling Stocks
and the International Law of Fisheries, 24 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 99 (1993).
92. See infra notes 117-122 and accompanying text. To illustrate, bluefin tuna, "the
world's most valuable fish," sells for up to US$260 per kilogram. Weber, supra note 36, at
34; see generally Colin W. Clark, The Economics of Overexploitation, 181 SCIENCE 630
(1973).
93. This reality is not limited to environmental issues. Instead, it reflects a larger trend
in the international arena. As Born notes:
This century's profound international political, economic, technological, and legal
transformations have significantly undermined the strict territorial presumption
that prevailed in nineteenth century conceptions of public international law. The
doctrine of territorial sovereignty has been eroded by the slow emergence of the
United Nations and other international institutions, the increasing importance of
public international law in domestic affairs, and the international community's di-
minishing patience with local tyrants and torturers. Technological advances have
ensured that "domestic" military, environmental, health, social and other develop-
ments have serious international consequences.
Born, supra note 10, at 61-62 (citations omitted).
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III. MONITORING AS THE BASIS FOR EFFECTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
The ability of a State to unilaterally withdraw from an agreement
can seriously undermine environmental initiatives. 4 To prevent and
mitigate defections, monitoring is required; without it, enforcement is
illusory.95 Consequently, monitoring plays a critical role as the basis for
an effective international enforcement regime. 96 This is particularly true
for agreements that deal with marine resources that must ensure compli-
ance over large spatial scales. Maintaining the efficiency and integrity of
marine verification regimes presents a number of challenges, including
the immense size of the world's oceans, the nature of the marine organ-
isms being protected, and the unique nature of violations that occur on
the seas.
As previously noted, the area of the planet's surface that is
considered ocean is immense and "when you're out of sight of land, no
one will know what you do."97 Accordingly, because "boats operate
practically unobserved in international waters, there is little scientific
information on the impact of drift net fishing on the marine
94. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
95. See David D. Caron, The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic
Marine Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 154, 171 (1995) ("[T]he notion that a common resource such as whales
can be sustainably managed is illusory, particularly when some of the users may act in bad
faith and the capacity of the resource manager to police such users is insubstantial.");
Samaan, supra note 11, at 271 ("The option to withdraw undermines the purpose of any
agreement."); Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1553 ("International law and inter-
national agreements, however, are undermined if states withdraw clandestinely. To prevent
clandestine defection, some actor or actors must monitor international agreements. Without
monitoring, enforcement becomes impossible.").
96. See, e.g., Shihata at 43. This is not to say that States enter treaties with the intent to
violate them:
Quite often, default is not intentional but results from poor implementation capac-
ity, especially when the convention does not require that a state comply with its
requirements as a condition for its entry into force with respect to that state....
Supervision has an increasingly significant role in the more sophisticated legal re-
gimes being created by modern environmental agreements. Setting up efficient
reporting mechanisms and procedures under a multilateral convention to promote
a better knowledge of each state's practices is useful.
Shihata, supra note 11, at 43 (citations omitted).
Monitoring and supervision play a .critical role in a number of recent, comprehensive
agreements, including Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, at 281-83, UN Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (1992), and the Draft International Covenant on
Environment and Development by the Commission on Environmental Law of IUCN.
97. Angier, supra note 6 (quoting Stephen Palumbi, Professor at the University of Ha-
waii).
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ecosystem."9' The difficulty of monitoring compliance over such an
immense space calls into question the capability of any organization-
even one properly structured and funded-to monitor compliance of
international marine agreements.99
This realization is especially disconcerting in light of the character-
istics of the organisms marine laws attempt to protect. In economic
parlance, marine fish and mammals are considered a "renewable re-
source."''t That is, extraction is theoretically sustainable where the rate
of removal is less than the rate at which the marine system in question
renews itself.'0 ' Unfortunately, we have been so effective at catching fish
98. Todd Campbell, The Snag with Driftnetting-This Chillingly Efficient Fishing
Method Threatens the Pacific Marine Environment, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 6, 1991, at 14.
99. Bostwick, in support of this, points out:
Control and effective monitoring of the fisheries is extremely difficult for the Pa-
cific island nations. To monitor effectively millions of square miles of ocean is
expensive and requires support, equipment, and enforcement strength. Fishing
fleets may avoid enforcement by fleeing to the high seas, by fleeing into another
country's EEZ, or by using avoidance tactics.
Lisa K. Bostwick, Empowering South Pacific Fishmongers: A New Framework For Preferen-
tial Access Agreements In The South Pacific Tuna Industry, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BuS. 897,
908 (1995).
100. See, e.g., A.A. Rosenberg et al., Achieving Sustainable Use of Renewable Re-
sources, 262 SCIENCE 828 (1993). The idea of a "renewable resource" should be contrasted
with resources that do not replenish on a time scale sufficient for human use. Differentiating
the two categories is often difficult:
To begin, we first address a definitional problem that is centered around the
meaning of renewable and nonrenewable resources. In discussing the scarcity of a
resource such as water many scholars, analysts, and scientists basically classify re-
sources into "renewable" and "nonrenewable" categories. In brief, it is currently
accepted to define nonrenewable resources as those which are finite, such as oil
and minerals, in contrast to renewable resources, such as water, which are tradi-
tionally viewed as "unending" and "replenishable."
Christopher L. Kukk & David A. Deese, At the Water's Edge: Regional Conflict and Coop-
eration Over Fresh Water, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 21, 25-26 (1996):
101. Thus, it is necessary to regulate the number of individuals caught so that enough
remain for breeding and for efficient fishing. See, e.g., Herman E. Daly, Elements of Envi-
ronmental Macroeconomics, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT
OF SUSTAINABILITY 33, 45 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991) ("Renewable resources.., should be
exploited on a profit-maximizing sustained yield basis and in general not driven to extinc-
tion .... Specifically this means that: a) harvesting rates should not exceed regeneration
rates; and b) waste emissions should not exceed the renewable assimilative capacity of the
environment.").
However, there is considerable disagreement among biologists, ecologists, and econo-
mists as to whether, in practice, fisheries can be managed in such a way as to ensure the
long-term survival of the resource. See, e.g., P.A. Larkin, An Epitaph for the Concept of
Maximum Sustainable Yield, 106 TRANS. AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y 1, 4 (1977) ("It may be nec-
essary to compromise MSY [maximum sustainable yield exploitation] in order to preserve
genetic variability. It does not seem likely that an MSY based on the analysis of the historic
statistics of a fishery is really attainable on a sustained basis."); Paul Christensen, Driving
[Vol. 19:497
Does the Emperor Have No Clothes?
that most of the world's major fisheries are either severely overfished or
are in danger of being so9.1O Moreover, traditional systems of regulating
fisheries are collapsing almost everywhere, due mainly to the pressure
of human population growth and the need to produce greater quantities
of fish.' 3
As Part II of this article discussed, the problems of overexploitation
are exacerbated by the fact that many marine organisms exist, and are
exploited, either while straddling the EEZs of coastal nations or on the
high seas.' 4 The U.S. biologist Garrett Hardin termed this situation the
"tragedy of the commons."'0 5 Although the activities of each individual
nation or group of nationals is "rational" in a neo-classical economic
sense, the collective activities of all nations fail to be "rational" because
the result is overexploitation.' °6 Consequently, "[m]ost contemporary
Forces, Increasing Returns and Ecological Sustainability, in ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: THE
SCIENCE AND MANAGEMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY 75, 84-85 (Robert Costanza ed., 1991)
("Thedifficulties [sic] with the sustainable yield concept have emerged most clearly in fish-
eries ecology .... Harvesting desirable species increases numbers of less desirable species,
as is too evident in fisheries history. The fisheries case points to the complexity of species
interaction in ecological systems.").
102. For example:
The catch has fallen in all but 2 of the world's 15 major marine fishing regions; in
4 of them, it has shrunk by more than 30 percent.... Analysts from the U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) found overfishing in one third of the fisheries
they reviewed; they found some depleted fish populations in nearly all coastal
waters around the world.
Weber, supra note 36, at 21. See also Joyner, The 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 40, at
749 ("The world's ocean fisheries today are ailing gravely from over-exploitation and degra-
dation of the marine environment,"); see generally D. H. CUSHING, MARINE ECOLOGY AND
FISHERIES (1975); S. BROWN AND ARIEL E. LUGO, MANAGEMENT AND STATUS OF U.S.
COMMERCIAL MARINE FISHERIES (1981).
103. See IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 105 ("These factors have encouraged the mod-
ernisation of techniques, such as the use of motor craft, the opening up of formally closed
systems to outsiders, the loss of traditional knowledge and the disappearance of customary
rules and institutions."); ENERGY & RESOURCE QUALITY, supra note 40, at 444.
104. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
105. See Hardin, supra note 50. Hardin's example was that of a common grazing
ground where each herder will tend to add to his herd as long as doing so increases his in-
come. Id. However, when all herders do this, the inevitable result is overgrazing and the
impoverishment of all herders. Id.
The economist H.S. Gordon outlined a similar argument for fisheries: "As long as fish
can be caught profitably, fisherman will continue to do so leading to overfishing." H. Scott
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 124 (1954). As a result, an equilibrium will be reached only when the fish stock has
been so overfished that revenues from fishing barely cover operating costs. Id. at 128-41.
106. See Clark, supra note 54, at 322 ("Resolving the tragedy of the commons is sel-
dom simple. It is the very nature of the tragedy that it results from perfectly rational behavior
on the part of individuals.").
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fisheries experts believe that we are approaching the limits of the ocean
to provide people with fishes."' 7
Thus, the basic premise-at least the basic scientific premise-that
underlies almost every international environmental agreement protecting
marine organisms is the need to set a maximum catch limit, primarily
through the use of quotas or regional moratoria."°s These "catch limits"
are often set by scientific panels based on a certain species' or ecosys-
tem's minimum requirements to reproduce and survive.'09 Typically,
once a maximum catch for a given species is set-for example, one
hundred minke whales per year from the North Atlantic"--each coun-
try is given a set portion of that total limit to allow their nationals to
catch. If a State, or its nationals, violates its quota for a given year, it is
usually not feasible to recalculate the quotas for the remaining parties,
although that recalculation is necessary in order to re-attain equilib-
rium.' Plainly, unilateral withdrawals-particularly clandestine
107. ENERGY & RESOURCE QUALITY, supra note 40, at 444 (citations omitted). See
also Richard C. Hennemuth, Man as Predator, in CONTEMPORARY QUANTITATIVE ECOLOGY
AND RELATED ECOMETRICS 507 (Ganapati . Patil & Michael L. Rosenzweig eds., 1979).
108. For example, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), which was
created pursuant to the 1978 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention, empowers its Fisher-
ies Commission to establish and allocate fishing quotas within its region of operation.
Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, opened
for signature Oct. 24, 1978, art. XI(4), Canada Treaty Series No. 11, 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter
NAFO Convention]. Under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, the
International Whaling Commission (IWC) is the regulatory body charged with setting quo-
tas. See ICRW, supra note 16, at art. V; International Convention for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (establishing quotas for
bluefin tuna and swordfish, and minimum size limits for other species).
109. See NAFO Convention, supra note 108, at art. XI(8). Under the NAFO Conven-
tion, the Fisheries Commission may refer any questions regarding conservation and
management within its regulatory area to its Scientific Council. Id. Similarly, under the In-
ternational Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, supra note 16, the IWC's quotas are
ostensibly based on scientific estimations of the number of individual whales of each spe-
cies.
In a similar context, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources made significant changes
in its management of the Lake Ontario sport fishery based on scientific estimates of the
lake's carrying capacity in order to stave off an "ecosystem collapse" See Ontario Ministry
of Natural Resources, News Release Communiqu6, April 15, 1993, ("'The decision ... is
based on scientific findings, and has been made in order to sustain an attractive and diverse
sport fishery on Lake Ontario in the future....' A reduction in predator demand is required
in order to sustain the entire fish community over the long-term."), in David S. Ardia, THE
ROLE OF MODELING IN LAKE ONTARIO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (1995) (unpublished M.S.
report, State University of New York, on file with author).
1I0. This is the actual 1989 minke whale catch limit set for the West Greenland Stock
in the North Atlantic. ICRW, supra note 16, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, at table 1 (schedule amended
June 1989).
111. See, e.g., Valeria Neale Spencer, Domestic Enforcement of International Law: The
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 109, 111 (1991) ("Since the [ICRW contains no mechanism to adjust a quota after a
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withdrawals-can significantly undermine the effectiveness of interna-
tional marine agreements because these agreements must rely on a quota
system tied to a maximum supportable extraction rate.
12
. In fact, the extent of past violations of international marine laws is
staggering."' It is not simply the magnitude of the violations, however,
that is significant to the discussion here; the nature of the violations also
undermines the effectiveness of international attempts at monitoring and
enforcement. Most international regimes are primarily concerned
with-and structured to deal with-ensuring the compliance of States. "4
However, many violations of marine agreements are perpetrated by in-
dividuals and non-state actors.'15 As stated in the wildlife protection
context, "the real conflict of interests is not between the states; it lies
between those whose economic or other interests involve the exploita-
tion of animals and the animals whose welfare is at stake."" 6
This reality cannot be overemphasized. For those actors intent on
violating international marine agreements, the transgression is an easy
one to "get away with." In oceans twice the size of all land surfaces
combined, where no nation patrols or even has jurisdiction to enforce its
laws, a ship, or group of ships, can easily catch whales and fish unseen.
nation elects to opt out, each nation that opts out of a quota throws the equilibrium off bal-
ance.").
112. See supra note 53. Illegal fishing seriously undermines conservation objectives:
Illegal fishing biases catch statistics necessary for effective fishery management as
well. Without accurate catch and by-catch statistics, it is impossible to determine
maximum or optimum sustainable yields or to monitor the health of the fish
stocks. Underreporting of catch sizes poses similar threats to effective fishery
management, conservation, loss of access fees, and sustainable development.
Bostwick, supra note 99, at 908.
113. See Angier, supra note 6 (discussing unreported killing of humphack whales by
the Soviet Union). In response to this new information, the IWC stated that it would have to
rewrite its catch figures for the last forty years-figures on which extraction and recovery
rates, as well as quotas, had been based. See Hearst, supra note 6. Ray Gambell, President of
the IWC stated: "We knew there was a black hole in our calculations which did not make
sense. Now we know that thousands of whales we thought were protected have been system-
atically slaughtered. The enormity of the deception is staggering." Id.
114. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 11, at 50 (tracing the development of international
law and noting that "the chief actors were governments, and the activities were conducted at
the interstate level").
115. Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1601 ("[I]nternational environmental
law ultimately seeks to regulate non-state actors-whether NGOs, businesses, or individu-
als."). Indeed, there is a growing recognition of the role of non-state violators in international
environmental law generally. See Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1551
("[A]lthough traditional international environmental law largely concerns itself with inter-
state actions, most environmental damage is caused not by states, but by individuals and
corporations."); see generally O'Connell, supra note 11.
116. Bowman, The Protection of Animals Under International Law, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L.
487,494 (1989).
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Unlike a forest, where an illegal clear-cut may remain visible for dec-
ades, a slaughtered 100 foot long, 150 ton blue whale leaves nothing to
mark its passing.117 In fact, once the catch is processed-which is often
done on the same ship or on a nearby "factory ship"-the product is
readily integrated into worldwide commerce where it is nearly impossi-
ble to trace.' 8
Not surprisingly, as fishing yields have declined over the past half-
century," 9 the economic incentives for individual extractors to turn to
"pirating" have become increasingly compelling.2 Frequently, fisher-
man and whaleman who wish to avoid their own government's scrutiny
will sail under a flag-of-convenience, a flag purchased from another,
often poorer country.' These "pirate" whaling and fishing ships are
devastating to a scientifically based quota system and exceptionally dif-
ficult to monitor.'
22
117. Cf. AMERICA, A Horse with No Name, on HORSE WITH No NAME (Dewey Bunnell
1971) ("The ocean is a desert with its life underground and a perfect disguise above."). The
largest recorded size for a blue whale (a female Antarctic blue) is approximately 100 feet
long and more than 150 tons, but the average is 70 to 85 feet long and 90 to 125 tons. ERICH
HOYT, THE WHALES OF CANADA 42 (1984).
118. See generally Angier, supra note 6 (discussing the difficulty of tracing illegal
whale products in worldwide commerce to the region where the whales were poached and to
the poachers themselves).
119. For example:
[T]otal pounds of fish caught each year by U.S. fisheries remained about constant
from 1950 to 1978 despite wild fluctuations in landings of individual species and
despite an estimated three- to fourfold increase in the quantity of economic energy
used for fishing. Thus the catch per effort (and the food energy returned per unit of
fossil energy invested) has declined considerably.
ENERGY AND RESOURCE QUALITY, supra note 40, at 446.
120. The financial rewards from certain species are quite lucrative. See Import Bans on
Bluefin Tuna a First, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS SERV., Dec. 4, 1996 (noting that the price for a
single bluefin tuna in Japan ranges up to $40,000). Clark argues:
The profits from whaling were immense. Large species such as the blue whale
cannot sustain an annual harvest of more than 2% or 3% of the breeding stock.
With normal rates of return on investment in the neighborhood of 10%, the
"optimum" strategy for the whalers was probably to simply wipe out the whales
and invest the proceeds elsewhere. This seems to be precisely what happened ....
Clark, supra note 54, at 325. See generally Colin W. Clark & R. Lamberson, An Economic
History and Analysis of Pelagic Whaling, 6 MARINE POL'Y 103 (1982); Clark, supra note 92.
121. See Jenkins, supra note 41, at 217; Bostwick, supra note 99, at 908 ("[T]he trans-
boundary nature of the industry is conducive to corporate veils. Owners may purchase flags
of convenience (reflagging), register vessels under different names, and establish intricate
owner/operator relationships:'); see also Driftnet Use Continues Despite Ban, THE GAZETTrE
(Montreal), July 19, 1993, at B2.
122. See PATRICIA BIRNIE, LEGAL MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION OF PIRATE
WHALING 2 (IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 19, 1982). Vessels which seek
to evade the IWC's regulations will typically register their vessel under the flag of a non-
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IV. EXISTING ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS IN
INTERNATIONAL MARINE LAWS
This part examines current mechanisms for the monitoring and en-
forcement of international environmental law protecting marine
organisms. Initially, it is helpful to have an understanding of existing
international environmental infrastructure generally. Once the basic in-
frastructure is laid out, this part briefly canvasses current international
agreements governing the marine environment. For the most part, these
agreements are neither comprehensive nor global. Instead, most are re-
gional or species-specific. Fortunately, the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention provides an important framework for the creation of a com-
prehensive regime for the marine environment. Finally, this part also
explores, in greater depth, a current controversial marine regulatory is-
sue: the protection of highly migratory fish populations.
A. Overview of International Environmental Infrastructure
The first official articulation of the need for international action to
protect living organisms came at the turn of this century when the Lon-
don Convention for the Protection of Wild Animals, Birds, and Fish in
Africa (London Wild Fauna Convention) was concluded on May 19,
1900. '23 Although the London Wild Fauna Convention was never rati-
fied, it marked the international community's first acknowledgment that
individual state protections were insufficient to protect the world's bi-
otic systems. Early international conservation laws, however, were not
global; rather, agreements were either regional, dealing with specific
geographic areas,'24 or sectoral, dealing with particular species."
It was not until 1972 that a global environmental infrastructure be-
gan to manifest itself in the form of the United Nations Environment
party state. Id.; see also Angier, supra note 6, at C4 (quoting Professor Stephen Palumbi,
"This just shows how much pirate whaling can occur without anyone noticing it.").
123. Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa, May
19, 1900, 94 B.F.S.P. 715. The original signatories were the African colonial powers of
France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The Convention's objective was
"to prevent the uncontrolled massacre and to ensure the conservation of diverse wild animal
species in their African possessions which are useful to man or inoffensive." Id. in Preamble.
124. For example the Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture,
signed in Paris on March 19, 1902, involved only European parties. Id. Similarly, the London
Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, signed on
November 8, 1933, only protected areas in Africa. See IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 7.
125. See, e.g., International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May
16, 1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63; Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in
the North Atlantic Ocean, Mar. 2, 1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10,789; International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
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Programme (UNEP).'26 The United Nations General Assembly estab-
lished UNEP to promote international cooperation on environmental
protection and to coordinate environmental action within the United
Nations.'27 Although UNEP has been successful in a number of limited
endeavors,'28 its role has been significantly limited by international poli-
tics and by its own organizational structure.
UNEP is a relatively small UN agency with a governing council and
secretariat located in Nairobi, Kenya. In the assessment of many observ-
ers, UNEP has generally failed to be an effective oversight and
enforcement institution due to its insignificant formal powers.29 In ad-
dition, UNEP's funding has been criticized as inadequate because it
must rely solely on voluntary contributions to the Environment Fund, its
primary funding source." ° As one commentator has remarked: "UNEP
does not have the power that one of the more specialized agencies of the
126. Also in 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment met in
Stockholm. The question of establishing an institutional structure for enforcement, however,
was not addressed. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1. See also Anne Thompson
Feraru, Environmental Actors, in ENVIRONMENT AND THE GLOBAL ARENA 43, 50 (Kenneth
A. Dahlberg et al. eds., 1985). For a discussion of the results of the conference, see generally
Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J.
423 (1973), and Christopher C. Joyner & Nancy D. Joyner, Global Eco-Management and
International Organizations: The Stockholm Conference and Problems of Cooperation, 14
NAT. RESOURCES J. 533 (1974).
127. See Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Co-
operation, G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 43, U.N. Doc.
A/8730 (1972); DOUGLAS WILLIAMS, THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE UNITED
NATIONS: THE SYSTEM IN CRISIS 46 (1987).
128. From its beginning:
UNEP has been successful in coordinating scientific data and research missions,
warning of environmental threats, creating 'soft law,' stimulating international
agreements on a wide range of environmental subjects, administering environ-
mental trust funds used to implement specific treaty regimes, and providing start-
up costs for specific international environmental treaties.
Anderson, supra note 11, at 806 (citations omitted).
129. See, e.g., Paul C. Szasz, Restructuring the International Organizational Frame-
work, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND
DIMENSIONS 340, 351-56 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1992); Palmer, supra note 71, at 263;
Jenkins, supra note 41, at 200 ("UNEP can claim some successes, but has no formal powers
and as presently constituted is an inadequate organ for the magnitude of world environmental
problems.").
130. See Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1585 ("UNEP has also been
chronically underfunded. In 1989, nations' contributions to its Environment Fund were be-
low the 1979 level in real terms.") (citing UNEP: 15th Session of the Governing Council, 19
ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 86, 87 (1989)); Anderson, supra note 11, at 807, 807 n.223 ("[iun 1994,
the UNEP Fund received total funding of less than US$46 million, of which the United
States provided nearly 50%.") (citing Contributions Pledged or Paid to the Fund of the
United Nations Environment Programme for 1994, as of 30 June 1994, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.173/2, at 37-38).
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United Nations has, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), and therefore it has little influence on the environmental policies
pursued by other United Nations agencies.' 31 Indeed, in 1993, the
UNEP Governing Council acknowledged these limitations when it
shifted UNEP's focus from environmental monitoring to helping devel-
oping countries use environmentally sound technologies.'32
Although a single "global" environmental compliance and moni-
toring agency currently does not exist, there are a number of smaller
regional agreements, species-specific agreements, and specialized ma-
rine organizations that provide regionalized monitoring and compliance
functions. These regional and species-specific structures are important
because they can be used as building blocks for the establishment of a
more comprehensive global system.
The United Nations Regional Seas Programme is an attempt to cre-
ate a comprehensive monitoring and compliance structure for the marine
environment. Under the United Nations Regional Seas Programme there
are eleven regions, containing 120 of the 130 coastal states.'33 Working
with UNEP, coastal states in each region formulate specific "action
plans" that identify areas of cooperation; these "action plans" are then
negotiated into specific conventions.' M However, much of the focus of
the Regional Seas Programme has been on pollution mitigation, with the
"sound management of natural resources" merely an ancillary objec-
tive.
131. Samaan, supra note 11, at 263. See also Caldwell, International Environmental
Politics: America's Response to Global Imperatives, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE
1990s, at 301, 316 (Norman Vig & Michael Kraft eds., 1990) (stating that UNEP "has very
limited ability to influence policies of the United Nations specialized agencies"); Institu-
tional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1585.
132. See UNEP to Focus on 'Capacity Building' in Developing Countries, Its Council
Decides, BNA INT'L ENVTL. DAILY, June 8, 1993.
133. See generally PETER H. SAND, MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL"LAW IN THE UNITED
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (1988).
134. Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 672 n.172.
135. Representative conventions include the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of
the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 285, art. 5 [hereinafter
Barcelona Convention] (requiring "all appropriate measures to prevent and abate pollution of
the Mediterranean Sea Area caused by dumping from ships and aircraft"); Kuwait Regional
Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution,
Apr. 24, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 511, art. Ill(a), IV [hereinafter Kuwait Convention] (seeking to
"prevent, abate, and combat pollution in the Sea Area" caused by "intentional or accidental
discharges from ships"); Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of
the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region, Mar. 23, 1981,
20 I.L.M. 746, art. 4(1) [hereinafter Abidjan Convention] (aiming "to prevent, reduce, com-
bat and control pollution of the Convention area and to ensure sound environmental
management of natural resources"); Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environ-
ment and Coast Area of the South-East Pacific, Nov. 12, 1981, U.N.Doc UNEP/GC/INF1 1,
185, art. 3(1) [hereinafter Lima Convention] (obligating parties to "prevent, reduce and con-
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For example, the most ambitious regional agreement, in terms of
geographic scope, is the Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region (hereinafter
"Noumea Convention").'36 The Noumea Convention obligates the parties
"to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the Convention Area from
any source, and to ensure sound environmental management and devel-
opment of natural resources."1" Although the Noumea Convention, as
well as the other Regional Seas Programme conventions, obligate con-
tracting states to "take all appropriate measures," the conventions lack
comprehensive monitoring, compliance, and enforcement structures. M
Furthermore, the Regional Seas Programme appears to lack integration
between the individual regional conventions.
In addition to the United Nations Regional Seas Programme, there
are several important regional agreements that govern living resources
trol pollution of the marine environment and coastal area of the [South Pacific]"); Conven-
tion for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean
Region, Mar. 24, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 227, arts. 5-7 [hereinafter Cartegena Convention]
(requiring parties to "prevent, reduce and control pollution"); Convention for the Protection,
Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern Afri-
can Region, June 21, 1985 [hereinafter Nairobi Convention], reprinted in SAND, supra note
133, at 156 (obligating parties to prevent, reduce, and combat pollution and to ensure sound
environmental management of natural resources); Convention for the Protection of the Natu-
ral Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, Nov. 24, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 41
[hereinafter Noumea Convention].
136. Noumea Convention, supra note 135. In its original form, the Noumea Convention
covered:
(i) the 200 nautical mile zones established in accordance with international law
off:
American Samoa, Australia (East Coast and Islands to eastward including
Macquarie Island), Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji,
French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia
and Dependencies Wallis and Futuna, New Zealand, Niue, Northern Mariana
Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Solomon Islands, To-
kelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa
(ii) those areas of high seas which are enclosed from all sides by the 200-nautical-
mile zones referred to in sub-paragraph (i); areas of the Pacific Ocean which have
been included in the Convention Area pursuant to article 3....
Id. at art 2(a). See also Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 677-78.
137. Noumea Convention, supra note 135, at art. 5(1).
138. Instead, parties are to apply "internationally recognized rules and standards."
Abidjan Convention, supra note 135, at art. 6. See also Barcelona Convention, supra note
135, at art. 5 ("all appropriate measures"); Kuwait Convention, supra note 135, at art. V ("all
appropriate measures"); Lima Convention, supra note 135, at art. 3 ("adopt appropriate
measures"); Cartegena Convention, supra note 135, at art. 5 ("all appropriate measures");
Nairobi Convention, supra note 135, at art. 4(1) ("take all appropriate measures"); Noumea
Convention, supra note 135, at art. 5 ("take all appropriate measures").
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in and around Antarctica, including the Antarctic Treaty,'39 its associated
Protocol on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic (Antarctic Proto-
col),'" and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources."' Five annexes are attached to the Antarctic Protocol,
covering environmental impact assessment,4 2 conservation of fauna and
flora,'4 3 waste disposal and waste management,'
44 marine pollution,' 5
and the creation of protected areas.' 4 As in the other agreements exam-
ined here, the parties to the Antarctic Protocol are obligated to take
"appropriate measures" to ensure compliance.' 47 However, actual com-
pliance with the Antarctic Protocol and its annexes is left solely to
individual governments party to the protocol.'"
There are also a number of treaty agreements that are designed to
manage and protect particular marine species. These include the Inter-
national Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas,' 49 the
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission,'50 the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the
North Atlantic Ocean, 3 ' the Treaty on Fisheries Between the Govern-
ments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United
139. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
140. Protocol on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M.
1455. The States party to the Antarctic Treaty that negotiated the protocol include Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, India, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. Joyner, Biodiversity,
supra note 30, at 680 n.218.
141. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 20,
1980, 19 I.L.M. 841 [hereinafter CCAMLR]. Discussed infra notes 162-171 and accompa-
nying text.
142. Antarctic Protocol, supra note 140, at Annex I, 30 I.L.M. 1473.
143. Id. at Annex II, 30 I.L.M. 1476.
144. Id. at Annex III, 30 I.L.M. 1479.
145. Id. at Annex IV, 30 I.L.M. 1483.
146. Id. at Annex V, available in 1991 WL 568527.
147. Id. at art. 13(1), 30 I.L.M. 1466.
148. Each party is expected to exercise enforcement powers over their flag ships and
over ships supporting that government's Antarctic operations. Id. at art. 2; Joyner, Biodiver-
sity, supra note 30, at 681-82 ("Enforcement is left to each contracting party.").
149. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966,
20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63. The International Commission for Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (ICCAT) is one of the most important organizations because it covers nearly all of the
Atlantic Ocean and has a significant number of member states. Parties to the treaty include
the United States, Japan, South Africa, Ghana, Canada, France, Spain, Brazil, Portugal, Mo-
rocco, Korea, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cuba, Angola and the Soviet Union.
150. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion, May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 230, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1950).
151. Convention of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, opened for signature Mar. 2,
1982, T.I.A.S. No. 10,789 (entered into force Oct. 1, 1983).
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States of America,' and the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling.'53 Although these agreements are important advances in the
conservation of marine biodiversity, their effectiveness is hampered be-
cause they are both regional and restricted to individual species."4 In
addition, enforcement mechanisms, if they exist at all, are ineffective
because these "conservation conventions must survive on little money
and skeleton staffs, as the Parties are generally unwilling to contribute to
more than a bare-bones budget."'55
Likewise, there are a number of important international and regional
organizations that have been established to manage particular aspects of
the marine environment, including fisheries. Arguably the organization
with the broadest geographic scope is the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). The United Nations established the IMO in 1959156
to provide a forum for governments on technical matters affecting
international merchant shipping. '  Membership in the IMO was
intended to represent both traditional maritime states and states that rely
on shipping.' As a result, the IMO has been primarily a forum for
merchant marine interests.'59  Nonetheless, through its Marine
152. Treaty on Fisheries, Apr. 2, 1987, U.S.-Certain Pacific Island States, 26 I.L.M.
1048.
153. ICRW, supra note 16.
154. See Julie R. Mack, International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference
on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the High
Seas, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 313, 321 (1994) ("ICCAT has not fared as well ... because it
suffers from the common problems of lack of consensus on management measures and allo-
cation levels. On the whole, organizations like these have simply been insufficient to regulate
migratory stocks on an international level."). See generally Christopher M. Weld, Critical
Evaluation of Existing Mechanisms for Managing Highly Migratory Pelagic Species in the
Atlantic Ocean, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 285 (1989).
155. IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 46. See also M. Johanne Picard, International Law
of Fisheries and Small Developing States: A Call for the Recognition of Regional Hegemony,
31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 317, 333 (1996) ("The most significant practical constraint is ICCAT's
inability to allocate allowable catches once it has determined the total allowable catch or
maximum sustainable yield of the fish stocks.").
156. The IMO was originally the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion. See THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION 1 (Samir Mankabady ed., 1984); J.
KIWANUKA, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 40-43 (1990).
157. See THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, supra note 156, at 1; see also
R. MICHAEL M'GONIGLE & MARK W. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 39-77 (1979).
158. See VI NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 551 (Robin Churchill et al. eds.,
1977).
159. See Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1595 ("[M]aritime business in-
terests view the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as attentive to their concerns.");
Eldon V.C. Greenberg, IMCO: An Environmentalist's Perspective, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
131, 135 (1976). As expected, the IMO has been criticized for bowing to pressure from the
shipping industry. See, e.g., ROBERT A. SHINN, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MARINE
POLLUTION CONTROL 123 (1974); Greenberg, supra, at 134.
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Environment Protection Committee the IMO has begun to focus on
pollution issues 60 Indeed, under Article 211 of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, the IMO is presumed to be the organization "competent" to
authorize establishment of marine pollution standards.16 ' Although the
Marine Environment Protection Committee of the IMO has an important
role in the reduction of marine pollution, it does not currently have an
identifiable role in the direct protection of marine organisms.
A second organization charged with protecting the marine environ-
ment is the Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR Commission). The CCAMLR Commission was
established under the authority of the Convention on the Conservation
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)'62 and "functions as
the primary conservation agency for the whole of the Southern Ocean,
encompassing all high seas ocean south of the Antarctic Conver-
gence.' 63 The CCAMLR Commission has considerable powers and may
designate protected species, set harvesting quotas, specify open and
closed seasons, and regulate harvesting methods.'" And, unlike other
160. See Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 670 ("Though the IMO initially placed
special emphasis on the safety of life at sea, it has recently focused on the prevention and
control of marine pollution from ships."). See also Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18,
at 1607-08 ("A special majority of [the Marine Environment Protection Committee of the
IMO] can adopt amendments to technical provisions in the 1973 Convention for the Preven-
tion of Pollution from Ships.'); M'GONIGLE & SACHER, supra note 157, at 48-49.
161. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 211, 21 I.L.M. 1310. See also Joyner,
Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 671 n.163 ("Article 211 provides that rules and standards for
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment should be es-
tablished through the 'competent international organization,' which is widely presumed'to be
the IMO.").
162. CCAMLR, supra note 141, 19 I.L.M. 841. The CCAMLR was negotiated follow-
ing the 9th Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party meeting in London in September and October
of 1977, and a special meeting of the Consultative Parties in 1978. See David M. Edwards &
John A. Heap, Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A
Commentary, 20 POLAR RECORD 353, 354-56 (1981). "The parties were brought to the ne-
gotiating table out of a concern that a lack of management in the past had been responsible
for the wholesale destruction of Antarctic resources." Stuart B. Kaye, Legal Approaches to
Polar Fisheries Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of the Convention for the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention, 26 CASE
W. RES. INT'L L.J. 75, 81 (1995).
163. Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 671; see also CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER,
ANTARCTICA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 221-62 (1992). "The Antarctic Convergence is the
meeting-place of the cold waters of the Antarctic and the warm waters from the north. It acts
literally as a biological barrier separating two different ecosystems inhabited by different
species." IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 48 n.9.
164. "Among these policies have been a precautionary cap on harvesting krill, closure
of certain fisheries for cod and mackerel around island groups in the region, prohibition of
certain pelagic and bottom nets based on mesh size, and a fishing vessel inspection and re-
porting system." IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 48. See also Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note
30, at 672.
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fisheries treaties, the CCAMLR lays-down specific principles of conser-
vation that govern the CCAMLR Commission's decisions regarding
harvesting and associated activities in the area covered by the conven-
tion.165 As a result, the CCAMLR has generally received praise from
commentators: "CCAMLR is therefore the first and only fisheries treaty
explicitly intended to function as an ecological treaty as well. It is ac-
cordingly much more than a commercial exploitation treaty and
constitutes a milestone in this field. 166
There are, however, significant limitations on the CCAMLR Com-
mission's effectiveness as a comprehensive conservation agency under
the CCAMLR. The CCAMLR Commission meets only once a year and
its decisions must be made by consensus. 6 This effectively gives any
participating state a right to veto any proposed measure.68 Conse-
quently, there is considerable institutional inertia that must be overcome
in order for the CCAMLR to make controversial decisions to protect or
limit catches. 69 The CCAMLR also contains no specific enforcement
procedures to allow the CCAMLR Commission to implement its meas-
ures. Instead, the CCAMLR provides that the CCAMLR Commission
can "draw to the attention" of contracting parties or third parties matters
that are inimical to the principles of the Convention, or that adversely
165. These principles include:
The prevention of the decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels
below those which ensure its stable recruitment.. the maintenance of the ecological
relationships between harvested, dependent and related populations of Antarctic
marine living resources...prevention of changes or minimization of the risk of
changes in the marine ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or
three decades....
CCAMLR, supra note 141, at art. lI(a)-(c). See also IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 49.
166. IUCN PAPER, supra, note 85, at 49. See also Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30,
at 672 ("Since 1982, the CCAMLR [Commission] has adopted, with expert scientific advice,
at least seventy-five conservation measures in accordance with an ecosystemic approach
aimed at sustaining biological diversity.").
167. See Ronald F. Frank, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 291, 309-10 (1983); Joyner, Biodiversity,
supra note 30, at 672. A U.S. proposal during the negotiations for a two-thirds majority vote
was rejected. W.M. BUSH, 1 ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 413 (1982).
168. Furthermore, although all States are bound to implement conservation measures,
they may object pursuant to Article IX(6). This permits an objection to a measure within
ninety days of its promulgation, thus making the measure non-binding on the objecting state.
Other members can use such an objection to call a meeting of the CCAMLR Commission to
review the offending conservation measure. Members may also lodge further objections to
the measure at the same meeting or within thirty days after it. CCAMLR, supra note 141, at
art. IX(6)(b)-(d).
169. See, e.g., IUCN PAPER, supra note 85, at 49 ("Unfortunately, decisions of the
Commission must be taken by consensus and this does not facilitate the taking of sound
conservation-based decisions.").
[Vol. 19:497
Does the Emperor Have No Clothes?
affect the implementation of it.'70 Thus, "the only weapon at the Com-
mission's disposal is the embarrassment of being publicly seen as a state
lacking an environmental conscience.
171
There are also a number of regional fishery associations that play a
role in the management of marine organisms. The Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries
Commission172 are examples of subregional fishery commissions desig-
nated to manage the conservation of marine "resources" within their
respective high seas fisheries. Although these associations are important
in the conservation of marine organisms, their overall usefulness is lim-
ited due to their circumscribed geographic scope and weak formal
powers.
The NAFO, one of the largest regional fisheries organizations, was
created by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 1978 as a
regional fisheries organization to "contribute through consultation and
cooperation to the optimum utilization, rational management and con-
servation of the fishery resources of the Convention Area."'' 7 Although
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention applies to all the waters of
the Northwest Atlantic, NAFO's regulatory powers extend only to the
"Regulatory Area"-that area of the Northwest Atlantic over which
coastal states have no jurisdiction."
NAFO's Fisheries Commission is responsible "for the management
and conservation of the fishery resources of the Regulatory Area."'7' The
170. CCAMLR, supra note 141, at art. X. Enforcement must be rendered domestically.
Id. at art. XXI(1). States are obliged to ensure enforcement of conservation measures which
are binding upon them, and to provide the Commission with data requested in relation to
their activities in the CCAMLR Area. Id. at art. XX.
171. Kaye, supra note 162, at 85.
172. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries,
Nov. 18, 1980, 1285 U.N.T.S. 129.
173. NAFO Convention, supra note 108, at art. 11(1). As of October 1995, there were
fifteen contracting parties to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention: Bulgaria, Canada,
Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, European Economic Community, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Ko-
rea, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, and the Russian Federation. See Notice of
Other Documents, 34 I.L.M. 1452 (1995).
174. NAFO Convention, supra note 108, at art. I. The Convention Area is defined as:
... the waters of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean north of 35' 00" north latitude and
west of a line extending due north from 35' 00" north latitude and 42' 00" west
longitude to 59' 00" north latitude, thence due west to 44' 00" west longitude, and
thence due north to the coast of Greenland, and the waters of the Gulf of St. Law-
rence, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay south of 78' 10" north latitude.
Id. at art. I(1). Article 1(2) defines the Regulatory Area as "that part of the Convention Area
which lies beyond the areas in which coastal States exercise fisheries jurisdiction." Id. at art.
1(2).
175. Id. at art. XI(l). Membership in the Fisheries Commission is determined by the
General Council and consists of contracting parties which participate in the fisheries of the
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Fisheries Commission, based on the advice of NAFO's Scientific Coun-
cil, has the power to establish and allocate fishing quotas to NAFO
members for various fishing stocks found in the international waters of
the Northwest Atlantic.'76 The Fisheries Commission can also "adopt
proposals for international measures of control and enforcement within
the Regulatory Area" in order to enforce various NAFO rules and regu-
lations.'
Similar to other regional fisheries organizations, NAFO has a num-
ber of deficiencies that render its conservation and management
measures largely ineffective. First, NAFO has no means of forcing
Member States to abide by the rules established by the Fisheries Com-
mission. Article XII of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention
allows any member of the Fisheries Commission to be exempted from
any new proposal made by the Fisheries Commission by simply voicing
an "objection" to that proposal to the Executive Secretary within a
specified time period. 7 8 If a majority of members voice objections to the
Fisheries Commission's proposal, the proposal does not become binding
on any of the Commission's members unless they later agree among
themselves to be bound by the proposal.'79
Article XII of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention also al-
lows a member of the Fisheries Commission to choose not'to be bound
by Commission rules and regulations already in force.'8° Once even a
single member has opted out of a particular Fisheries. Commission
managerial or conservatory measure in this manner, any other Commis-
sion member may cease to be bound by that measure upon the date that
the Executive Secretary receives notice of the member's intention not to
be bound.'
Regulatory Area and any contracting parties which have provided satisfactory evidence that
they expect to participate in the fisheries of the Regulatory Area during the year of that an-
nual meeting or during the following calendar year. Id. at art. XIII(I).
176. Id. at art. XI(2) and (4).
177. Id. at art. XI(5).
178. Id. at art. XII(1). If a member objects to the Commission's proposal, that member
is not bound by the proposal, and the proposal binds only those member states that did not
voice objections. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at art. XII(3). A Commission member must simply file a notice of intent not to
be bound by a particular measure at any time after one year from the date on which the
measure became effective and must give notice to the Executive Secretary of its intention nbt
to be bound. Id. If that notice is not withdrawn, the measure ceases to be binding on that
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Second, NAFO contains limited enforcement mechanisms.182 Al-
though Member States have the right to board and inspect the vessels of
other Member States within the NAFO Regulatory Area, only the flag
state (the state under whose jurisdiction the vessel operates) can prose-
cute and. sanction vessels for violations of NAFO rules."3 Not
surprisingly, many flag states are reluctant to prosecute and sanction
their own fishing vessels for violating NAFO rules.'"T For example,
NAFO records indicate that of the forty-nine European vessels charged
in 1993 with offenses such as misreporting catches or the use of illegal
nets, only six were prosecuted by their flag state.'
B. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
The States Parties to this Convention .... [r]ecognizing the de-
sirability of establishing through this Convention, with due
regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas
and oceans which will facilitate international communication,
and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the
equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conser-
vation of their, living resources, and the study, protection and
preservation of the marine environment .... [h]ave agreed as
follows.
8 6
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 7 (1982 LOS Convention) is
perhaps the preeminent global legal regime governing the marine
environment.' As one commentator has stated: "The provisions
182. See Kedziora, supra note 7, at 1146 (stating that "NAFO's second major weakness
lies in its toothless enforcement mechanisms."); WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982 AND BEYOND 335-36 (1994).
183. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention states that the parties to the Conven-
tion agree to implement "a scheme of joint international enforcement." NAFO Convention,
supra note 108, at art. XVIII. This "include[s] provision[s] for reciprocal rights of boarding
and inspection by the Contracting Parties and for flag State prosecution and sanctions on the
basis of evidence resulting from such boarding and inspections." Id.
184. Kedziora, supra note 7, at 1146.
185. Id. at 1146 (citing Fisheries H: Canada Asks to Postpone NAFO Meeting,
GREENWIRE, Mar. 20, 1995); See Mack, supra note 154, at 322-23 (noting the unwillingness
of flag states to prosecute their own vessels).
186. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, in Preamble.
187. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8. As of July 25, 1997, there were 119 parties
to the Convention. During 1996, twenty-seven states ratified or acceded to the Convention,
which entered into force on November 16, 1994. A current list of parties to the Convention is
available at <gopher://gopher.un.org:70/1 I/LOS/STATUSALL STAT2LOS.TXT>.
188. See, e.g., Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 656 ("The 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.. furnishes the highest level global directives currently
available for protecting and preserving biological diversity in the marine environment.");
Joyner, The 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 40, at 750-51 ("The 1982 United Nations
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contained in Part XII of the Convention-'Protection and Preservation
of the Marine Environment'-do not merely restate existing
conventional law or state practice. These articles are actually
constitutional in character."' 9 Indeed, the 1982 LOS Convention is a
major contribution to the establishment of a comprehensive framework
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
The 1982 LOS Convention was opened for signature on December
10, 1982, with 117 States as signatories.'9 The Convention, however,
did not enter into force until 1993, eleven years after opening, when on
November 16, 1993, Guyana deposited the sixtieth ratifying instrument
with the Secretary General.' 9 The 1982 LOS Convention partitions the
world's oceans into three jurisdictional zones: the territorial sea-a belt
of sea adjacent to a coastal state not to exceed twelve nautical miles;92
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)-an area adjacent to, but extend-
ing up to two hundred nautical miles beyond, the territorial sea where
the rights of the coastal nation and the rights of other nations are gov-
erned by the Convention;9 and the high seas-which comprise all parts
of the oceans that are not included in EEZs, territorial seas, or the inter-
nal waters of a state.194
Much of the 1982 LOS Convention is devoted to jurisdictional is-
sues and obligations within the two hundred nautical mile EEZs. Coastal
states have two primary obligations concerning marine organisms within
their EEZs. First, coastal states are to ensure, through proper conserva-
tion and management measures, that the living resources of their EEZs
are not endangered by over-exploitation. Second, coastal states are
responsible for determining the allowable catch of the living resources
Convention on the Law of the Sea represents a global consensus on the fundamental rights
and duties of international fisheries law.").
189. Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 656. Joyner further states: "In this respect,
Part XII embodies the first serious effort to construct and codify a public international law
framework that deals with the degradation of and threat to biodiversity in the world's marine
environment." Id. at 656-57.
190. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at 1261.
191. Article 308 of the Convention provides that the convention shall not enter into
force until twelve months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or
accession. Id. at 1327. See also 5 CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A
COMMENTARY 203 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1989).
192. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 2-3, 21 I.L.M. at 1272.
193. Id. at Part V, art. 55, 21 I.L.M. at 1279.
194. Id. at Part VII, art. 86, 21 I.L.M. at 1286.
195. Id. at art. 61(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1281. A coastal state is obligated to maintain popula-
tions of harvested fisheries at levels that produce a "maximum sustainable yield." Id. at art
61(3). For discussion and criticism of maximum sustainable yield and the economics of fish-
eries see supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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within their EEZs, and their own capacity to harvest that catch. 96
Plainly, coastal states are the primary regulatory authority within their
respective EEZs; thus, "[w]ith regard to animals occurring in the EEZ of
a State, the sovereignty of the State concerned has been explicitly es-
tablished."'97
i. Jurisdiction Beyond the EEZs
With regard to conservation issues beyond a state's EEZ, the 1982
LOS Convention is considerably less forthcoming. This is an important
oversight because of the migratory nature of many marine organisms.
Migratory and straddling fish stocks' 9 raise a number of jurisdictional
problems concerning which State is entitled to regulate their conserva-
tion and use.'99 Because straddling fish and mammal stocks "straddle"
the lines between the high seas and a coastal state's EEZ, and because
highly migratory stocks tend to move between various jurisdictional
areas and the high seas, any conservation efforts undertaken by a coastal
state within its own EEZ can be undermined by indiscriminate fishing in
areas beyond the coastal state's jurisdiction.'
The 1982 LOS Convention contains two articles dealing specifically
with highly migratory and straddling fish stocks.2' 1 Under article 63,
coastal states and other states fishing for migratory or straddling fishing
stocks must seek to agree, either directly or through regional fisheries
organizations, upon the measures necessary to ensure conservation and
196. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 61(1) & (2), 21 I.L.M. at 1281. A
coastal state must set the permissible catch at a level that prevents over-exploitation of the
harvested species. Id. at art. 61(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1281.
197. De Klemm, supra note 50, at 938 (citing 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at
art. 56).
198. Straddling fish stocks are fish stocks which tend to "straddle" jurisdictional lines,
and highly migratory fish stocks are fish stocks which tend to move between various juris-
dictions. Id. at 935-37 (discussing the status of various types of migratory species).
199. Because migratory species can exist within the EEZs of many different coastal
states as well as on the high seas, they raise particularly thorny issues within the 1982 LOS
Convention's conservation framework. See generally De Klemm, supra note 50, at 935;
Christopher C. Joyner & Peter N. De Cola, Chile's Presential Sea Proposal: Implications for
Straddling Stocks and the International Law of Fisheries, 24 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 99
(1993). A recent agreement addressing straddling and highly migratory fish stocks is dis-
cussed infra notes 220-233 and accompanying text.
200. See Donald M. McRae, State Practice in Relation to Fisheries, 84 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 283, 286 (1990) (arguing that the "benefits of effective management on the
one side of a boundary may be negated by the actions of the state on the other side"); Mark
Christopherson, Toward a Rational Harvest: The United Nations Agreement on Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Species, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 357, 364-66 (1996) (stating that
the nature of straddling and migratory fish stocks has made them particularly susceptible to
overfishing).
201. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 63-64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
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to promote the optimum utilization of these fishery stocks.2 Although
the Convention sets out general goals concerning straddling and migra-
tory fish stocks, it does not provide any specific directives detailing how
states are to achieve these goals. 3 -
Articles 116 to 120 of the Convention concern the conservation and
management of living resources in the high seas. Foremost is Article
116, which provides that "[a]ll States have the right for their nationals to
engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: (a) their treaty obligations;
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States."
20 4
Juxtaposed against the explicit right of States to fish on the high seas is
the obligation of all States to "take measures which are designed, on the
best scientific evidence available to the State concerned, to maintain or
restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the
maximum sustainable yield."20 Consequently, the Convention estab-
lishes a visible tension between the need for conservation and
exploitation that in some instances may hamper the effective protection
of marine organisms. This tension is especially pronounced where na-
tions pursuing conservation objectives, such as coastal states attempting
to protect migratory species, compete with distant-water fishing nations
who are attempting to maximize fishing returns.2°
202. Id. at art. 63, 21 I.L.M. at 1282. Article 63(2) states:
Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclu-
sive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal
State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either
directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree
upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent
area.
Id. at art. 63(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
203. See Kedziora, supra note 7, at 1141; Christopherson, supra note 200, at 367
(noting that the Convention does not provide any substantive rights in disputes between
coastal states and fishing nations); Donald M. Grzybowski et al., A Historical Perspective
Leading Up to and Including the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 55 (1995) (commenting on the
failure to provide guidelines for cooperation); Shigeru Oda, Fisheries Under the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 739, 754 (1983) (arguing that the
Convention has overlooked the basic problem of the allocation of these fishery resources
among states).
204. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 116, 21 I.L.M. at 1290.
205. Id. at art. 119, 21 I.L.M. at 1291.
206. As Joyner explains:
The management of high seas fisheries may well remain the most contentious
problem for the contemporary law of the sea. Increasing national population pres-
sures have led to intensified national fishing efforts. As foreign fishing activities
have increased both within and outside EEZs, concerns over resource conservation
and environmental protection have led to more restrictive allocation strategies by
coastal states. Hence, there is a conflict between coastal states and distant water
fishing nations.
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This tension is evident in the 1982 LOS Convention's enforcement
provisions. Generally, a State's capacity to enforce provisions of the
Convention declines as the distance from its coast increases. For exam-
ple, a coastal state's authority to enforce pollution regulations depends
on both the location of the violation and the location of the offending
vessel at the time enforcement is attempted.2° Under Article 220, when
a pollution violation has occurred in a State's territorial sea, the State
"may undertake physical inspection of the vessel relating to the viola-
tion and may, where the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings,
including detention of the vessel." Conversely, when a coastal state
believes a pollution violation has occurred outside its territorial sea, but
within its EEZ, its enforcement options are limited to "requir[ing] the
vessel to give information regarding its identity and port of registry, its
last and its next port of call and other relevant information required to
establish whether a violation has occurred."2°9
As in other -substantive areas within the Convention's scope, the
1982 LOS Convention is considerably more detailed concerning the
control and prevention of pollution than in the conservation of living
resources. In all, the Convention devotes ten articles to the enforcement
of pollution laws and controls.21° In comparison, one article is devoted to
the enforcement of a coastal state's "sovereign rights to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic
zone."211 This is not to say that coastal states are given insubstantial
enforcement powers over living marine resources; within its EEZ a
coastal state is granted extensive powers, including "boarding,
inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in
Joyner, The 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 40, at 760. This tension is exacerbated by the
fact that the best, and therefore most economical, fisheries exist in or near the EEZs. Territo-
rial waters and the EEZs encompass about 40% of the world's oceans (see Mack, supra note
154, at 317), and 90% of its marine resources (see OUR CHANGING FISHERIES 25-29 (Sidney
Shapiro ed., 1971)). In order for distant fishing states to maximize their fishing returns, they
must exploit these high yield fisheries. In order for coastal states to effectively conserve their
local fishing stocks, however, they must limit fishing in both their EEZ and the adjacent sea.
207. Generally, the location of the violation dictates a coastal state's ability to enforce
Convention provisions. However, where a "vessel is voluntarily within a port or at an off-
shore terminal of a state, that State may ... institute proceedings in respect of any viola-
tion ... when the violation has occurred within the territorial sea or the exclusive economic
zone of that State." 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 220(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1313.
208. Id. at art. 220(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1313. In no event, however, may a state impose cor-
poral punishment or imprisonment. See Joyner, The 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 40, at
754.
209. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 220(3), 21 I.L.M. at 1313.
210. See id. at arts. 213-22, 21 I.L.M. at 1311.
211. See id. at art. 73, 21 I.L.M. at 1284 (Enforcement of laws and regulations of the
coastal state).
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conformity with this Convention." 1 ' Rather this observation is meant to
highlight the need to more fully develop an enforcement framework for
marine organisms similar in detail to that provided for the regulation
and prevention of pollution.
This need is particularly evident where highly migratory fish and
marine mammals are involved. Migratory species can exist within the
EEZs of many different coastal states as well as on the high seas.2 ,3 In
these instances, the 1982 LOS Convention provides little definitive
guidance. For example, where a species occurs within the EEZ of two or
more coastal states, the 1982 LOS Convention requires that "these
States shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or
regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to co-
ordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks. 214
Therefore, many species cannot be effectively protected without ad-
ditional bilateral and multilateral agreements between coastal states. An
illustrative example is pacific salmon, an anadromous species1 5 that
212. Id. at art. 73(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1284. See also Shabtai Rosenne, Establishing the In-
ternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 806, 813 (1995); Joyner, The
1982 LOS Convention, supra note 40, at 753-54. In its entirety, Article 73 states:
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest
and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with
the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the
posting of reasonable bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in
the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the ab-
sence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other
form of corporal punishment.
In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly
notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any
penalties subsequently imposed.
1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 73(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1284.
213. Common "highly migratory" species include tuna, dolphin, sharks, and whales.
See 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, annex 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1329.
214. Id. at art. 63(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1282 (emphasis added). These fish stocks are com-
monly termed "straddling stocks." Similarly:
Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclu-
sive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone [i.e. the high
seas], the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area
shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organiza-
tions, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in
the adjacent area.
Id. at art. 63(2), 21 I.L.M. at 1282. See also id. at art. 64, 21 I.L.M. at 1282 (covering the
highly migratory species listed in Annex I).
215. Anadromous species spawn in freshwater and live in saltwater.
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spends its juvenile stage within an individual state's territorial waters
and EEZ, spends its adult life beyond that state's EEZ, and in order to
reproduce returns to the same freshwater spawning grounds it left as a
juvenile."6 Clearly, the spawning coastal state has a strong interest in the
management of this species and thus a compelling need to be able to
enforce its conservation plans. Yet, in the case of anadromous stocks,
the 1982 LOS Convention states that "enforcement of regulations re-
garding anadromous stocks beyond the exclusive economic zone shall
be by agreement between the State of origin and the other States con-
cerned."'2 7 Consequently, the 1982 LOS Convention provides an
inadequate enforcement framework for these migratory species. Indeed,
the drafters of the 1982 LOS Convention implicitly recognized this
limitation by stating:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the
competence of an international organization, as appropriate, to
prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals
more strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall co-
operate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and
in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the ap-
propriate international organizations for their conservation,
management and study.18
Thus, the drafters of the 1982 LOS Convention not only recognized the
potential inadequacy of the Convention's enforcement provisions, but
explicitly stated that the Convention does not stand in the way of a more
comprehensive solution.
ii. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stock
and Highly Migratory Fish Stock
On August 4, 1995, the United Nations Conference on Straddling
Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stock adopted an Agreement
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement or
216. A recent dispute between Canada and the United States is an example of this type
of conflict. In 1994, the treaty that had governed the number of migrating sockeye salmon
that could be taken by Canadian and American fisherman expired, and was not renewed.
Egan, supra note 1, at Al, A12. On July 19, 1997, Canadian fisherman blockaded an Alas-
kan ferry, claiming that Americans were taking more than 500,000 sockeye salmon as they
swim through Alaskan waters on their way south to Canada to spawn. See id.
217. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 66(3)(d), 21 I.L.M. at 1282 (emphasis
added). Generally, under the Convention, States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate
do have the primary interest in and responsibility for such anadromous stocks. Id. at art.
66(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
218. Id. at art. 65, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
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Agreement). 9 The Agreement is an important step towards addressing
some of the deficiencies in existing international marine treaties,
particularly the 1982 LOS Convention. Besides calling for the
application of a precautionary approach to the conservation,
management, and exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks,220 the Agreement contains significant duties of cooperation in
managing marine organisms.
The Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement requires coastal states with
jurisdiction over straddling or migratory fish stocks, as well as other
States whose nationals fish for such stocks in the adjacent high seas, to
seek, directly or through appropriate regional fisheries organizations, to
cooperate in the adoption and implementation of measures necessary to
conserve these stocks in the adjacent high seas.22 Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, only those States that are members of such organizations or that
agree to abide by the conservation and management measures of such
organizations shall have access to the fishery resources managed and• .• 222
protected by the organizations. This requirement "constitutes a sig-
nificant departure from the unrestricted freedom of fishing on the high
seas embodied in traditional principles of fisheries law."
223
219. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stock, Conference on
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
164/37 (1995), 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) [hereinafter Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement]. The
stated purpose of the Agreement is to "ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use
of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks through effective implementation
of the relevant provisions" of the 1982 LOS Convention. Id. at art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1272. As
of August 5, 1997, fifteen states had ratified the Agreement, and there were fifty-nine signa-
tories. In accordance with its Article 40, the Agreement will enter into force thirty days after
the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification or accession. Id. at art. 40, 21
I.L.M. at 1277. A current list of parties to the Agreement is available at
<gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/LOS/STATUS_ALU STAT_ 164.TXT>.
220. The precautionary approach requires, inter alia, that States err on the side of con-
servation in setting fishing quotas and implementing conservation policies when scientific
information is uncertain, unreliable, or incomplete. Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, supra
note 219, at art. 6(2). Article 6(2) states: "States shall be more cautious when information is
uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not
be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management meas-
ures." Id.
221. Id. at art. 7(l)(a). As part of their duty to cooperate, the Agreement requires
coastal states and high-sea fishing states to become members of regional fisheries organiza-
tions or to participate in such arrangements by agreeing to apply the conservation and
management measures established by such organizations or arrangements. Id. at art. 8(3).
222. Id. at art. 8(4).
223. Ambassador Satya N. Nandon of Fiji, Chairman of the United Nations Conference
on Straddling Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stock, stated, "It's no longer a free-for-
all situation. The freedom to fish on the high seas no longer exists as it did under the Law of
the Sea Convention." Ambassador Satya N. Nandon of Fiji, Chairman of the United Nations
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The Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement also seeks to improve the en-
forcement of management measures established by regional fisheries
organizations. Similar to the enabling treaties that created NAFO and
other regional fisheries organizations, the Migratory Fish Stocks
Agreement places the initial burden of enforcement on the flag state."2
The flag state can police its fishing fleets through licenses and permits,
and is required to monitor and control its fishing vessels through na-
tional observer programs, inspection schemes, and regional and sub-
regional observer schemes including satellite transmitter tracking of
fishing vessels.'2
,Unlike other fisheries agreements, however, the Migratory Fish
Stocks Agreement does not rely solely on the flag state for enforcement:
In a significant departure from the traditional principle that only
the flag state has sovereignty over its vessels, the... Agreement
allows states which are members of regional fisheries organiza-
tions to board and inspect fishing vessels flying the flag of
another state which is a party to the... Agreement but which is
not necessarily a member of that particular fisheries organiza-
tion in order to check for violations of conservation and
226management measures.
The flag state can either proceed with its own investigation and en-
forcement or can authorize the inspecting state to conduct the
Conference on Straddling Fish Stock and Highly Migratory Fish Stock, quoted in, William
Branigin, Global Accord puts Curbs on Fishing: Pact Aims to Preserve Dwindling Supplies,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4 1995, at Al, A28, and cited in Kedziora, supra note 7, at 1153.
224. Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 219, at art. 18(l)-(2). Moreover, the
Agreement prohibits a flag state from authorizing a vessel to operate under its flag unless
that state is capable of effectively managing and controlling the vessel. Id. at art. 18(2).
225. Id. at art. 18(3). In addition, the flag state has the primary responsibility for the
prosecution and sanctioning of any violations committed by vessels operating under its flag.
Id. at art. 19(1)(b).
226. Kedziora, supra note 7, at 1154. Article 21 states:
In any high seas area covered by a subregional or regional fisheries management
organization or arrangement, a State Party which is a member of or a participant in
such organization or arrangement may, through its duly authorized irispectors,
board and inspect, in accordance with paragraph 2, fishing vessels flying the flag
of another State Party to this Agreement, whether or not such State Party is also a
member of the organization or a participant in the arrangement, for the purpose of
ensuring compliance with conservation and management measures for straddling
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks established by that organization or ar-
rangement.
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 219, at art. 21(1). If there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a fishing vessel is violating regional conservation and management
measures the State inspecting the vessel must secure evidence of these alleged violations and
notify the State under whose flag the ship is registered. Id. at art. 21(5).
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appropriate investigation and to take any necessary enforcement ac-
tion.27 Furthermore, if the flag state does not respond to the allegations
made by the inspecting state within three working days, and if the al-
leged violations are classified as "serious," the inspectors may remain
on board to secure evidence and may detain the vessel in port for
"further investigation."
22
Plainly, the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement is a significant im-
provement to the present regime for the protection of straddling and
highly migratory fish stocks. In addition to strengthening existing com-
pliance and enforcement measures in regional fisheries agreements, the
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement provides a strong incentive for non-
members to join regional fishery organizations. For example, shortly
after the introduction of the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, the
United States joined NAFO.2 9
Nevertheless, while the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement is an im-
portant step forward, the Agreement leaves a number of problems
unresolved. First, the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement does not ad-
dress the consensual nature of the regional fishery organizations. 20 The
Agreement relies almost exclusively on the ability of regional fishery
organizations to reach agreements on common measures, quotas, and
procedures. However, as discussed above, most (if not all) regional fish-
ery organizations do not require all members to agree on rules or quotas,
227. Id. at art. 21(6)-(7). Furthermore, the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement requires
party states to "take measures consistent with this Agreement and international law to deter
the activities of vessels flying the flag of non-parties which undermine the effective imple-
mentation of this Agreement." Id. at art. 33.
228. Id. at art. 21(8)-(1 1).
229. See Mack, supra note 154, at 322 (discussing the early failure of the United States
to join NAFO). The U.S.'s reluctance to join NAFO has not escaped criticism:
Although the United States took part in negotiations surrounding NAFO's crea-
tion, it did not formally join NAFO largely because of pressure from American
fishermen, who, as long as the United States was not a NAFO member, could fish
in NAFO's Regulatory Area with immunity from NAFO rules and quotas. With the
introduction of the [Migratory] Fish Stocks Agreement, the United States had a
strong interest in joining NAFO not only to maintain its access to the high sea
fisheries controlled by NAFO, but also to participate in NAFO's rulemaking and
quota-setting functions.
Kedziora, supra note 7, at 1157.
230. Similar to the 1982 LOS Convention, and apparently in recognition of the need to
strengthen regional fisheries organizations, the Agreement states:
States shall cooperate to strengthen existing subregional and regional fisheries
management organizations and arrangements in order to improve their effective-
ness in establishing and implementing conservation and management measures for
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 219, at art. 13.
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and even allow their members to opt-out of restrictions they find disa-
greeable."'
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the newly created enforcement
procedures will largely depend on the willingness of flag states to
prosecute and sanction violations of the regional fishery agreements.232
As one commentator has noted:
Under the [Migratory] Fish Stocks Agreement, each NAFO
member has the primary duty to enforce regional rules and
regulations and to prosecute and sanction any violators operat-
ing under that member's jurisdiction. However, a NAFO
member that opts out of a NAFO regulation will be very un-
likely to fulfill its enforcement mandate under the Fish Stocks
Agreement by prosecuting and sanctioning its own vessels for
violating NAFO rules which, under valid NAFO procedures, no
longer apply to it.
233
iii. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
The newly established International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) will apply and interpret the 1982 LOS Convention.2 3 parties to
the Convention are required to submit disputes over interpretation to the
Law of the Sea Tribunal, the International Court of Justice, or to arbi-
tration, although ITLOS has exclusive jurisdiction over deep seabed
mining disputes. ITLOS has not yet heard its first case, but "[t]he Tri-
bunal is expected to have an active docket. '36
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Although many of the agreements protecting the marine environ-
ment have set laudable objectives in the protection of marine organisms,
231. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
232. See Kedziora, supra note 7, at 1160; Mack, supra note 154, at 331 (noting that the
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement leaves the flag state with primary responsibility over in-
vestigation and sanctioning).
233. Kedziora, supra note 7, at 1160.
234. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 15, 21 I.L.M. at 1284. The state parties
elected twenty-five judges for ITLOS for staggered terms in August 1996, and they were
sworn in on October 18, 1996. Judge Thomas A. Mensah of Ghana was elected its President
and Judge Rudiger Wolfrum of Germany its Vice President for a period of three years. See
ITLOS Press Release ITLOS/Press/l of Oct. 5, 1996; Peter H.F. Bekker et al., International
Courts and Tribunals, 31 INT'L LAW. 599, 607 (1997).
235. Rosenne, supra note 212, at 812-13.
236. David Stoelting, International Courts Flourish in 1990s, NEW YORK L.J., Aug. 4,
1997, at S2.
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the attainment of these objectives has generally been unsatisfactory. Be-
cause the existing framework for the enforcement of international
environmental agreements is insufficient to protect the marine environ-
ment, a new apparatus is necessary. The solution proposed here suggests
utilizing non-governmental organizations as an aid in monitoring and
enforcement under the auspices of a new international marine monitor-
ing and coordination agency. This part begins by outlining the proposed
agency's objectives, structure, and sources of information. Next, poten-
tial enforcement mechanisms are examined. Finally, this section
discusses the many benefits that would accompany the creation of an
international marine monitoring and coordination agency with compre-
hensive jurisdiction.
A. An International Marine Monitoring and Coordination Agency
The lack of a centralized supranational authority is often cited as the
crucial barrier to effective environmental protection and management.237
For the most part, current intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) with
marine jurisdiction have been limited to circumscribed regions and
subjects.238 Even with this limitation, however, IGOs still "play an indis-
pensable role in the creation and enforcement of international law."'239
Any proposed solution must recognize the indispensable role of IGOs
and, as suggested here, NGOs.240
The author proposes a new agency: an international marine moni-
toring and coordination agency (IMMCA). The IMMCA should have
several clearly defined objectives:
1. Serve as a repository for data and information on marine
organisms: Using the latest computerized imaging, storing,
and cataloging techniques, the IMMCA should develop a
237. See sources cited supra note 33.
238. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
239. Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1586 (citing F. MORGENSTERN,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1986) and A. BENNETI, IN-
TERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 14-15 (3d ed. 1984)). For example, "[a]lmost every major
environmental treaty was initiated by an IGO." Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at
1587. In addition, many IGOs serve as secretariats for treaties. See id. at 1587; Scarff, The
International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary As-
sessment, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 326, 354-57 (1977).
240. An NGO is a "private international organization that serves as a mechanism for
cooperation among private national groups in international affairs." THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW DICTIONARY 77 (Robert L. Bledsoe & Boleslaw A. Boczek eds., 1987). NGOs have also
been described as private organizations "not established by a government or by intergovern-
mental agreement which are capable of playing a role in international affairs by virtue of
their activities." Hermann H.K. Rechenberg, Non-Governmental Organizations, 9 EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (1986).
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system for the solicitation and acceptance of data and in-
formation from IGOs, NGOs, and state entities.
2. Actively monitor the conservation status of marine organ-
isms within its jurisdiction: This requires standardized,
systematized, and ongoing procedures for the collection of
data. Standard monitoring and measuring techniques must
be established in order to ensure legitimacy.
3. Assess compliance: Within the framework of the relevant
conservation treaties, the IMMCA should develop standard
evaluation techniques for determining if parties are in com-
pliance. In addition, a process should be established for the
resolution of disputes brought by complaining parties and
parties found to be in non-compliance.
4. Disseminate information: The IMMCA should ensure that
its data and information, as well as its determinations of
compliance, are made available to the widest audience. In
addition; a process for compilation and a standardized
method of presentation should be developed in order to fa-
cilitate statistical analyses.
5. Serve as coordinator and catalyst for other IGOs and
NGOs: Recognizing the indispensable role of IGOs and
NGOs, the IMMCA should establish institutional arrange-
ments for continuous cooperation between relevant
governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental
organizations.
The IMMCA's institutional structure and implementing mechanisms
should reflect these purposes.
i. Jurisdictional Issues
It is essential that the IMMCA be given the widest possible juris-
diction. This will provide a number of benefits, including greater
efficiency, reduction in the proliferation of international bodies, and an
increased potential for integrated and comprehensive global protec-
tion.2 ' The author recognizes that initially this may not be politically
feasible; but however modestly it begins, as the IMMCA establishes its
legitimacy, the objective should be to incorporate as many marine
agreements as possible under its jurisdiction. This jurisdictional grant
241. See, e.g., Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1578 ("[I]ntemational envi-
ronmental agencies are more successful when they have a wider scope of activity"). These
benefits are discussed more fully infra Part V.D.
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can be accomplished through the IMMCA's implementing document,
the amendment of existing marine agreements, and the grant of author-
ity to the IMMCA in future marine treaties.2
Furthermore, the creation of an organization such as the IMMCA is
expressly allowed under the 1982 LOS Convention. The 1982 LOS
Convention provides:
Nothing in this Part restricts the fight of a coastal State or the
competence of an international organization, as appropriate, to
prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals
more strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall co-
operate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and
in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the ap-
propriate international organizations for their conservation,
management and study.243
ii. Informational Issues
The IMMCA should be granted the explicit authority to determine
the compliance of parties to the agreements under its jurisdiction. Few
international organizations have explicit authority to monitor and assess
compliance, but such authority has been written into some standard set-
ting resolutions.2" There are at least three potential means of acquiring
the information necessary for the IMMCA to assess compliance: active
acquisition of data by the IMMCA itself, regular auditing of data and
information from party states themselves, and passive acquisition from
other IGOs and NGOs.
242. Current international law requires that states must explicitly agree to the creation
of a supranational body before it can be established, and that existing agreements must be
amended in order to bind the parties to those agreements. See Abram Chayes & Antonia H.
Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in International Regulatory Regimes, in
PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 280, 308 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991); A.S.
Feshchenko, Phenomenon of Supranationality in Activities of International Organizations,
1987 SOVIET Y.B. INT'L L. 170-71; Oran R. Young, The politics of international regime
formation: managing natural resources and the environment, 43 INT'L ORG. 349, 360-61
(1989). Consequently, existing treaties must be amended if the IMMCA is to have a role in
their enforcement.
243. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 65, 21 I.L.M. at 1282.
244. See, e.g., Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion, Mar. 6, 1948, art. 3, para. (a), art. 16, para. (i), 9 U.S.T. 621, 624, 627; Constitution of
the International Labour Organisation, June 28, 1919, art. 405, 49 Stat. 2712, 2722-24,
T.I.A.S. No. 874, at 12; Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956,
art. III, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 1096, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, at 4, 276 U.N.T.S. 3, 6; see also Institutional
Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1606 ("such authority has often been written into the origi-
nal resolutions adopting standards"); MORGENSTERN, supra note 239, at 125-27 (discussing
the use of this power by the UN General Assembly, the International Labour Organization,
and the World Health Organization).
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First, the IMMCA can itself actively acquire the information neces-
sary to assess compliance. This can be accomplished through a regular
inspection program or through inspections that are instituted on the ba-
sis of suspected violations. There are a number of existing marine
agreements that ostensibly require some form of regular inspections,
including, inter alia, the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, 4 Protocol
on Environmental Protection of the Antarctic;2" the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources; 247 and although not
actually an "international agreement," the U.S. Driftnet Monitoring and
Assessment Act.2"
Active inspection as the result of suspected violations also has
precedent in existing international agreements. For example, the World
245. Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 219, at art. 18(3) (requiring party
states to monitor and control their fishing vessels through both national observer programs
and inspection schemes as well as regional and sub-regional observer schemes including
satellite transmitter tracking of fishing vessels).
246. Antarctic Protocol, supra note 140 (providing that inspections of stations, installa-
tions, equipment, ships, and aircraft should be carried out to protect the Antarctic
environment and to ensure protocol compliance).
247. See Joyner, Biodiversity, supra note 30, at 672 (noting that among the policies
adopted by the CCAMLR Commission is a fishing vessel inspection program). For a discus-
sion of the CCAMLR and the CCAMLR Commission, see supra notes 162-186 and
accompanying text.
248. Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1822
(1994) [hereinafter Monitoring Act] (requiring international negotiations to assess the impact
of driftnetting on marine mammals). Under pressure from the U.S., a number of foreign
fishing fleets agreed to place scientific observers on their vessels:
The actions of the United States in threatening sanctions under the Driftnet Moni-
toring and Assessment Act resulted in agreements that placed scientific observers
on driftnetting vessels. The data collected by these observers allowed the interna-
tional community to conclude that the concerns about the destructive effects on
many species of marine life being voiced by the opponents of large-scale driftnet-
ting were justified.
Jenkins, supra note 41, at 215. See also Monitoring Act § 4004(a) (allowing sanctions for
failure to agree to monitoring and to U.S. scientific observers on board driftnet vessels). U.S.
and Canadian fisheries officers regularly perform on board monitoring. For example, the
Northern Pacific Fisheries Management Council requires on board monitoring to ensure
compliance with its quotas. Benjamin and Weiss note that:
A major problem anticipated by the regulators is that of "high-grading"--dumping
low-value fish at sea so that higher value fish may be landed and recorded without
exceeding the quota. Monitoring of discarded by-catch is carried out by observers
on board the fishing vessel. These were originally put on board to measure by-
catch so that it would be figured into the total allowable quota. However, this in-
formation has become increasingly important for enforcement, and the observers
have become subject to more or less subtle psychological pressure and sometimes
to offers of bribes.
Antonio Herman Benjamin & Charles Weiss, Jr., Economic and Market Incentives as Instru-
ments of Environmental Policy in Brazil and the United States, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 67, 95
(1997).
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Bank Inspection Panel (Inspection Panel), comprised of three inspec-
tors, was established to provide "people directly and adversely affected
by a [World] Bank financed project with an independent forum through
which they can request the Bank to act in accordance with its own poli-
cies or procedures."2 49 Once a request for review is received, the
Inspection Panel undertakes a study of the problem and notifies' World
Bank management of any potential problems within three weeks.50 The
World Bank is required to respond to the Inspection Panel's findings
within twenty-one days. 5' One commentator has remarked that the
World Bank Inspection Panel "has not yet been heavily tested and will
almost certainly have difficulties considering its small size," but went on
to state that "the idea behind it appears sound so long as the panel re-
mains independent and non-superficial." '
Incorporation of some form of analogous investigative mechanisms
in the IMMCA would provide an effective means of monitoring compli-
ance as well as a strong incentive for States to provide accurate and
timely data on their own fishing and whaling operations.25 Unlike regu-
lar inspection procedures, however, active investigation often entails an
adversarial inquiry. Therefore, it is critical that the IMMCA's imple-
menting documents expressly authorize adversarial inspections and
clearly lay out the procedures to be followed . However, "[e]ven. absent
such authority, world opinion might be effectively mobilized to induce
an accused state to accept an investigation once a credible charge is
made. ,55
A second way the IMMCA can acquire the information necessary to
assess compliance is through regular auditing of data and information
submitted by party states themselves. 56 Under'such a program, States
249. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE IN-
SPECTION PANEL 4-5 (1994).
250. Id. at 9-12.
251. Id. at 21.
252. Anderson, supra note 11, at 817.
253. In an analogous situation, the establishment of human rights complaint procedures
and inspections have significantly aided the enforcement of international human rights law.
See, e.g., Markus G. Schmidt, Individual Human Rights Complaints Procedures Based on
United Nations Treaties and the Need for Reform, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 645 (1992).
254. See HENRY G. SCHERMER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1253, at 694-
95 (1980); see also Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1607 (adversarial investi-
gation "is usually thought to require express authorization in the institution's charter or by
agreement of the members"). Currently, several IGOs are similarly authorized. Schermer,
supra, §§ 1246-1251, at 692-94, §§ 1256-1270, at 695-706.
255. See Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1607.
256. Many current agreements already require some form of reporting duty on the part
of participating states. Under the Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, for example, participat-
ing states must keep detailed statistics on total catches by fleet, including records of fish
length, weight, and sex. Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 219, at Annex I, arts.
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would periodically report their current catch statistics, the position of
their fishing and whaling fleets, and an assessment of their own compli-
ance. 7 The IMMCA would then audit these reports to ensure their
accuracy as well as performing an independent assessment of each party
state's compliance."8 Analogous systems of information exchange are
already required by the 1982 LOS Convention29 and by other interna-
tional agreements.2 °
3(1)(a) & 3(2)(a). The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling requires
States to communicate statistical data about their catches to the International Bureau of
Whaling Statistics. ICRW, supra note 16, at art. 10(a)-(e) (requiring information on date of
taking, place, species, sex, and length).
257. In fact, most countries currently maintain most, if not all, of these statistics in or-
der to perform economic analyses and to regulate their fleets. See, e.g., 50 C.FR. § 600.45
(1996) (requiring that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration collect and
maintain fisheries statistics). Cf. David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role in International
Environmental Law and its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 287, 305 n.l15 (1991) ("The United States regulates its own fleet very carefully to
avoid taking porpoises.") (citing Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1984)
(upholding regulation requiring vessel owners to consent to placement of observers on their
boats who could collect data for use in civil or criminal penalty proceedings)).
258. An independent assessment of compliance is needed because, based on past prac-
tices, -some States will be reluctant to submit accurate catch statistics. See, e.g., U.N. Food
and Agricultural Organization, Fisheries Technical Paper No. 337, WORLD REVIEW OF
HIGHLY MIGRATORY SPECIES AND STRADDLING STOCKS 24 (1994) (noting that only five of
the top sixteen tuna-catching countries reported catch statistics to the FAO in 1991). The
1991 U.S. General Accounting Office Survey, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ARE NOT WELL MONITORED,
GAO/RCED 92-43 (1992), and the 1992 study conducted for the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED) on the Effectiveness of International Environ-
mental Agreements, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 12-15 (Peter H.
Sand ed., 1992), found only a small proportion of states rigorously complied with reporting
requirements.
259. Article 119-Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, requires
that:
Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a
regular basis through competent international organizations, whether subregional,
regional or global, where appropriate and with participation by all States con-
cerned.
1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 119(2) (emphasis added), 21 I.L.M. at 1291. See
also Joyner, The 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 40, at 756 ("The U.S. government is
supposed to exchange scientific data and catch information with other states.").
260. For example, the International Labor Organization currently monitors compliance
under various multilateral conventions. Shihata, supra note 11, at 47; see also Peter H. Sand,
International Cooperation: The Environmental Experience, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 236, 273-76 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991); Institutional Arrangements,
supra note 18, at 1606 ("In such schemes, states regularly report on their compliance, and
IGOs then audit these reports to ensure their accuracy.").
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A third potential means for the IMMCA to acquire information is
from other IGOs and NGOs. IGOs, such as the Northwest Atlantic Fish-
eries Organization and the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission,
and NGOs, such as Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and Greenpeace,
may be the most cost effective information sources available to the
IMMCA. Indeed, aggressive NGOs have been instrumental in docu-
menting many recurring violations of international marine agreements.
For example:
[d]uring January 1990, ... Greenpeace, using marine scientists,
photographers, translators, scuba divers, and a skilled crew were
able to obtain the first ever documentation of the impacts of
[driftnet fishing]. We observed over 16 species of fin fish,
sharks and marine mammals dead and dying in the driftnets, in-
161cluding extremely rare species.
Unlike most governmental agencies, these organizations are independ-
ently funded, leanly staffed, and well suited for monitoring the marine
environment.6 2
Assuming appropriate funding, it is certainly possible for the
IMMCA to acquire data and information under all three proposed meth-
ods. Recognizing that sufficient funding may not be available-at least
initially-the most cost effective methods of information acquisition
appear to be regular auditing of data and information from party states
themselves, and passive acquisition from other IGOs and NGOs. Nev-
ertheless, because the IMMCA's ability to monitor and assess
compliance is contingent upon accurate, complete, and timely informa-
tion, it would be advantageous to provide institutional mechanisms
within the IMMCA to allow it to utilize as many information sources as
possible.6 '
261. High Seas Driftnet Fishing: Hearing before the National Ocean Policy Study of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 45
(1991) (statement of Ben Deeble). The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society has similarly
"infiltrat[ed] heavily guarded docks in Kaosiung, Taiwan, [and] counted 40 new or refur-
bished boats, [and] another 27 [refitted] for driftnetting." The Modern-Day Mariner Who
Gives Piracy a Good Name, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 30, 1992, at F3.
262. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 41, at 217-18 ("Environmental activist groups have
been important in documenting the existence of this pirate [whaling and fishing] industry:');
Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1607 ("NGOs routinely investigate and publi-
cize complaints of noncompliance."); cf. Adam M. Gee, Debt for Nature Swaps: The Past,
the Present, and the Future, at 16 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) ("The
local NGO may be first to know if their government is violating conditions of the debt for
nature swap").
263. Indeed, it is widely recognized that "[e]nvironmental policy-making is only as
good as its primary scientific information system." SHINN, supra note 159, at 124.
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iii. Issues Regarding the Determination of Party Compliance
The IMMCA should also develop standard evaluation techniques for
determining if parties are in compliance with the relevant marine
agreements under its jurisdiction. In practical terms, the parameters of
the IMMCA's compliance assessment procedure will likely be dictated
by each individual marine treaty, leaving the IMMCA with little discre-
tion in formulating assessment criteria. This is not problematic because
the purpose of the IMMCA is not to dictate substantive standards; that is
left to party states and to the diplomatic/political processes of the inter-
national community. Instead, the IMMCA's role is to ensure that marine
treaties will be implemented and that determinations of compliance can
be made. Because the IMMCA is not empowered to promulgate stan-
dards, its decisionmaking will more likely be regarded as unbiased.
Toward this end, it is critical that the IMMCA's compliance assessment
process be perceived as legitimate.
In order to enhance legitimacy, party states and relevant non-state
actors should be made fully aware of the IMMCA's decisionmaking
process and the specific criterion used to determine their compliance. In
addition, the assessment process must be perceived as fair. In the inter-
national arena, fairness requires that affected parties be given the
opportunity for meaningful participation. 265 As has been noted by others,
"[t]o the extent that IGO decisionmaking procedures provide affected
parties with an opportunity to participate meaningfully, the procedures
will be considered more legitimate and the standards they produce will
have greater credibility and thereby greater force." '266
An essential component of this participation is the provision of dis-
pute resolution procedures.267 However, it is probably not feasible or
necessary to create a formal adjudicative body within the IMMCA.266
264. See Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1604 ("[S]tates and individuals
are more likely to comply with IGO decisions when they perceive IGO processes and the
rules they produce to be legitimate.").
265. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177-80
(1985); cf. Sands, supra note 61, at 399-401 (discussing NGO participation as a source of
legitimacy).
266. Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1600. See also Thomas M. Franck,
Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 706 (1988) ("[I]n a commu-
nity organized around rules, compliance is secured-to whatever degree it is-at least in part
by perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed.").
267. See Abdulbar Al-Gain, Agenda 21: The Challenge of Implementation, in A LAW
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 21, 30-31 (Alexandre Kiss & Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin eds.,
1994).
268. One reason an adjudicative body within the IMMCA is not necessary is because
current international adjudicative structures should be able to provide some relief to ag-
grieved parties, particularly if current standing requirements are relaxed. See infra Part V.B.
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Instead, the IMMCA should adopt procedures modeled on the U.S. Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA).2 69 The APA provides procedures for
formal notice, comment, and a petition process that can be modified to
suit an international context. The IMMCA should establish procedures
for notification when a party state, or its nationals, is found to be in non-
compliance. The non-complying state, as well as any other interested
parties, would then be given a set period of time to comment on the
IMMCA decision. Although the IMMCA would not be obligated to
heed the comments, it should be required to consider them.O In addi-
tion, the IMMCA should develop procedures to allow States, IGOs, and
NGOs to petition or file a complaint in order to have the IMMCA de-
clare a State in non-compliance.27 The IMMCA would again provide
formal notice and a subsequent comment period. Thus, regardless of
whether the IMMCA ultimately changes its decision, both mechanisms
should increase the perceived legitimacy of its decisionmaking process.
iv. Information Dissemination Issues
A primary purpose of the IMMCA should be to disseminate
information and to act as a clearinghouse for other IGOs and NGOs.
Access to the IMMCA by IGOs and NGOs can contribute to
strengthening environmental commitment below the state level, and thus
provide an additional layer of accountability.2 Furnishing information
to IGOs and NGOs will also provide reciprocal benefits: by reducing
their costs for gathering and analyzing information, the IMMCA can
enable these organizations, particularly NGOs, to spend more resources
on gathering information, conducting publicity campaigns, directing
269. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1994). See also Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18,
at 1603 (suggesting that a model method for ensuring public participation is the U.S. Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act).
270. Under the APA, U.S. courts do review agency decisions in light of the comments
received. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-16
(1971); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
271. Such a procedure would be similar to the APA, which allows individuals to peti-
tion agencies for changes in regulations. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(1994).
272. See Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1577 (concluding that providing
NGOs with "greater access would also create an additional accountability network that
would encourage the development of environmental policy"); P. LOWE & J. GOYDER,
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS IN POLITICs 7-85 (1983) (discussing the role of environmental
groups in national politics). Moreover, "[tihis phenomenon may be more relevant at present
to the less developed countries which also lack strong internal mechanisms for self enforce-
ment, such as influential NGOs provide." Shihata, supra note 11, at 39. For a discussion of
the many other benefits of NGO participation see discussion infra Part V.B(ii).
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political pressure, and engaging in other enforcement techniques. 3 In
fact, many existing environmental agreements already contain extensive
programs for NGO participation and access.7 4 The Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, for example,
strongly encourages the participation of NGOs and IGOs.275 Under the
Convention on the Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) regime NGOs
are allowed to attend and participate at CITES meetings. 6 Similarly, the
UN Economic and Social Council permits NGOs to attend meetings,
submit short written, statements, be granted hearings, and propose
agenda items.2'7
Finally, it is essential that the IMMCA establish institutional ar-
rangements that foster and provide for continuous cooperation between
States, IG~s, and NGOs. Indeed, the importance of coordination and
collaboration cannot be overstated." Almost every international agency
deals with environmental issues, at least peripherally.7 9 Many of these
273. See Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1564-65 (stating that "international
agencies can lower the costs for these actors, and in so doing raise the probability that they
will become involved in the enforcement process").
274. For a detailed discussion of NGOs and their increasingly valuable role in interna-
tional iaw, see Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries Of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183 (1997).
275. CCAMLR, supra note 141, at art. XXIII(2). See also Kaye, supra note 162, at 87
("Another unusual feature of CCAMLR is the level to which it encourages the participation
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).").
276. Convention on the Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened
for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
277. E.S.C. Res. 1296, 44 U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 21, 22, U.N. Doc.
EJ4548 (1968). See also WILLIAMS, supra note 127, at 261-62.
278. See Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1580 ("Effective international
environmental agreements must therefore establish institutional arrangements for continuous
cooperation."); Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond Environmental Diplomacy: The Changing Insti-
tutional Structure of International Cooperation, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
DIPLOMACY 13 (John E. Carroll ed., 1988); Chayes, supra note 35, at 2. In addition, Shihata
argues:
Continuous cooperation among national agencies through direct, permanent con-
tacts has been instrumental in the success of many environmental agreements.
Establishing permanent networks to operate as channels of communication and
verification should serve as an effective way to ensure compliance with the moni-
toring requirements of international environmental agreements under present
conditions. The agreements can facilitate the task by increasingly empowering na-
tional agencies (both governmental and non-governmental) to carry out such
functions, thus ensuring the "self-enforcement" of treaty obligations.
Shihata, supra note 11, at 46.
279. See Harold K. Jacobson & David A. Kay, A Framework for Analysis, in EN-
VIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION, 1, 13 (David A. Kay &
Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1983); Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1582 (stating
that "[a]lmost every IGO deals with environmental issues, whether exclusively, substantially,
or as a by-product of its other responsibilities") (citations omitted).
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agencies, as well as numerous NGOs, deal specifically with marine is-
sues.mo Moreover, countless domestic governmental agencies make
environmental decisions that have international ramifications.2' Each of
these organizations offers some degree of expertise and political influ-
ence that can be valuable in the protection of the marine environment.
B. Potential Enforcement Mechanisms
As discussed above, the IMMCA should not be empowered to di-
rectly render enforcement. This will provide a number of important
benefits. First, the IMMCA can remain focused on the dual roles of
monitoring and assessing compliance. Second, valuable institutional
resources will not be consumed by what is oftentimes a speculative en-
deavor. Third, the IMMCA will avoid problems of bias associated with
active enforcement. Fourth, the international community's acceptance of
the IMMCA's findings should provide party states with the necessary
legitimacy and "political cover" to take a more active role in enforce-
ment themselves, thus obviating the need for the IMMCA to provide
enforcement. Finally, other organizations, particularly NGOs, are better
suited to provide enforcement.
In some instances, mere publication of an IMMCA finding of non-
compliance might provide the impetus for a non-compliant state to
change its conduct. This type of response by a non-compliant state has
been called "shame" compliance. Indeed, "[flew nations like to be re-
garded as international pariahs and shame as a sanction ought not to be
underestimated. ' 'U2 Even if a State does not ultimately modify its be-
280. Examples discussed in this article include, inter alia, the International Whaling
Commission, International Maritime Organization, CCAMLR Commission, Northwest At-
lantic Fisheries Organization, and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society.
281. See Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1582 (noting that "dozens of
domestic governmental agencies have jurisdiction over environmental issues on which deci-
sions are made at the international level"); Id. at 1582 n.18 ("From 1970 to 1980, the number
of nations with environmental agencies increased from ten to nearly one hundred.") (citing
A. Feraru, Environmental Actors, in ENVIRONMENT AND THE GLOBAL ARENA 43, 50 (K.
Dahlberg et al. eds., 1985)).
282. Palmer, supra note 71, at 281. See also Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE
97-98 (1974); Anderson, supra note 11, at 812 (noting that" 'shame compliance' has proven
to be an effective enforcement provision given adequate public exposure to the problem").
One commentator posits that:
In environmental law, the goal is to obtain compliance before the environment is
harmed, not after the harm has occurred. Monitoring and reporting are helpful
compliance techniques because in a decentralized system, as Oran Young explains,
reputation assumes greater importance. "'Soft responsibility' based on monitoring
and reporting is increasingly used for compliance control, particularly as it 'allows
states that are prepared to co-operate in dealing with a problem to do so without
unduly restricting their freedom of action.'"
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havior, "the force of international opinion virtually requires noncon-
forming states to put forth reasons-even if based on notions of
sovereignty-for their non-observance."" 3 This "culture of compliance"
can be an important tool for the IMMCA and the international commu-
nity to use to pressure noncomplying states to alter their conductS'and to
keep states from taking actions in contravention of agreements in the
first place.285
i. Enforcement by Party States
Should more subtle methods of enforcement prove ineffective,
IMMCA determinations of noncompliance will likely provide party
states with the necessary legitimacy and "political cover" to take a more
active role in enforcement. This type of enforcement can take the form
of either unilateral or multilateral action by party states. Although mul-
tilateral action may be politically preferable to unilateral action,
unilateral action is often easier to institute, swifter, and more decisive.286
Unilateral action is more feasible where the international community
O'Connell, supra note 11, at 56 (citing Oran Young, Compliance in the International System,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 99, 101 (Richard Falk et al. eds.,
1985), and quoting Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections
on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 123, 127-28 (1992)).
283. Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1605. See also Chayes & Chayes,
supra note 242, at 290-91.
284. Indeed, the UN has been very successful in utilizing diplomatic and public pres-
sure to induce compliance:
The lack of enforcement power by the UN is well known and is often used by
skeptics to criticize not only the UN, but public international law in general. Al-
though the UN cannot order or control member states, it does wield significant
power by using diplomatic pressure and public opinion to induce compliance from
states seeking legitimacy in the international arena. This "culture of compliance"
is extremely significant in that it results in states conforming their behavior even
when it may be contrary to their short-term interests.
Catherine Tinker, Environmental Planet Management by the United Nations: An Idea Whose
ime Has Not Yet Come?, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 793, 796 n.10 (1990) (citation omit-
ted).
285. Compare Adams v. Vance, 570 F2d 950, 956 n.13 (1977), in which the U.S. argued
it should not be required to object to an IWC decision because:
[I]argely as a result of United States leadership-and pressure-no country has
objected to a quota established by the International Whaling Commission since
1973 .... It is possible that an objection by the United States at this time could
lead to a cycle of objections by others which would damage the effectiveness of
the established quota system. If this should ensue, a number of whale species
would soon face extinction.
286. See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing Interna-
tional Environmental Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 79-83 (1981).
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recognizes that a clear transgression has occurred . 7 In this respect, the
IMMCA can be instrumental in credibly establishing that a noncom-
plying state has indeed transgressed. Moreover, the mere threat of
unilateral action may be sufficient to compel States to honor their treaty
obligations. As one scholar has remarked: "Rigid law strictly interpreted
conveys threats effectively." 8
There are also a number of ways that party states can provide for the
enforcement of existing international marine agreements. Under the
1982 LOS Convention, States have the right-and the obligation-to
enforce both international law and domestic law within their EEZs.f 9 In
addition, a State can provide enforcement extraterritorially by (1) cre-
ating domestic legislation pursuant to international agreement, which it
subsequently enforces outside its territorial boundaries,2'9 or (2) enforc-
ing existing international standards outside its territorial boundaries.291
Few international agreements protecting marine organisms, how-
ever, contain explicit enforcement mechanisms; thus, party states must
often create enforcement mechanisms through domestic legislation. In
recognition of this, many marine agreements obligate parties to "adopt
appropriate measures" to ensure compliance. 92 Even when no obligation
is stated, the need to implement international agreements often implies
an obligation that party states adopt subsequent enforcement measures
on their own. For example, although the United Nations Resolution es-
tablishing a moratorium on driftnet fishing is non-binding, it specifically
"encourages all members... to take measures individually and collec-
287. Cf. Michael L. Burton, Legalizing the Sublegal: A Proposal for Codifying a Doc-
trine of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 85 GEO. L.J. 417, 446-47 (1996) (discussing
the advantages of a UN resolution providing guidance on the use of unilateral humanitarian
intervention).
288. Driesen, supra note 13, at 304. Professor Driesen concluded that the U.S. threat of
unilateral action played an important role in the negotiations of the 1978 International Con-
ference on Tanker Safety and Pollution, and noted that "[tihe success of the [U.S.] strategy
probably depended in part upon other nations' belief that the United States would carry out
its threat." Id. at 304.
289. See supra notes 191-197 and accompanying text.
290. Regulation in this context can actually take two forms: legislation and adjudica-
tion. See generally Extraterritorial Regulation, supra note 23, at 1612-24. See also supra
note 82.
291. For example, in March 1995, Canadian ships seized and impounded a Spanish
fishing trawler and cut the nets of another Spanish boat for alleged violations of international
quotas and regulations governing the fishing of Greenland Halibut in the international waters
of the North Atlantic. Clyde H. Farnsworth, When They Talk About Fish, the Mellow Canadi-
ans Bellow, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1995, at A 1l. See generally Kedziora, supra note 7.
292. See, e.g., Lima Convention, supra note 135, at art. 3(1) (obligating parties to "take
all appropriate measures" to ensure compliance); Antarctic Protocol, supra note 140, at art.
13(1) (leaving enforcement to each contracting party but obligating each party to take
"appropriate measures" to ensure compliance); see supra Part IV.A.
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tively, to prevent large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing operations on the
high seas.""29 No country has been more active in this regard than the
United States.2
As previously noted, individuals, rather than state actors, are the
perpetrators of an increasing proportion of violations of international
law; this is particularly true with marine law violations.295 Accordingly,
because most nations' domestic enforcement mechanisms are already
equipped to deal with individual and corporate entities, these enforce-
ment procedures should be considered for use in the present context.
Indeed, domestic courts already enforce a significant portion of interna-
tional law.296
Most domestic courts have some expertise in environmental subject
matter and are well suited to adjudicate the fact specific determinations
that are necessary to rule on issues of compliance.2 Perhaps most im-
portantly, these courts can exercise the necessary jurisdiction over assets
and persons which is essential for effective enforcement. Moreover,
many of these courts can issue injunctions, which may prevent viola-
tions from occurring.
The simplest way for a domestic court to enforce international law
is by enforcing domestic law that implements international law. As dis-
cussed in Part II of this article, international agreements ordinarily go
through demanding domestic ratification processes and, because many
are not self-executing, require domestic implementing legislation before
293. United Nations: General Assembly Resolution on Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet
Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A.
Res. 46/215, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 31 I.L.M. 241 (1992).
294. The United States has enacted considerable legislation aimed at enforcing interna-
tional marine conservation agreements. See, e.g., Tuna Conventions Act of 1950, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 951-961 (1994); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); 1971
Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1994); Atlantic Tu-
nas Convention Act of 1975, 16 U.S.C. § 971 (1994); Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994); Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16
U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1994); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1994);
Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act of 1987, 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (1994);
Driftnet Act Amendments of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1826 (1994); International Dolphin Conser-
vation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1994).
295. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
296. See O'Connell, supra note 11, at 57 ("The idea of expanding the use of domestic
courts for international environmental law enforcement against citizens and governments of
other countries is a more recent and interesting concept."). See also F.A. Mann, International
Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 336 (1973).
297. See O'Connell, supra note 11, at 57-58 ("The use of domestic courts makes par-
ticular sense in the environmental area because domestic courts tend to focus on the most
common polluters-individuals and corporations.").
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they can be enforced. 98 Thus, after becoming a party to these agree-
ments, party states, through their legislatures, adopt laws that apply to
the state's citizens or territory.299
Nevertheless, regardless of the precise origin of the underlying sub-
stantive standard being enforced, States still face the difficult task of
projecting a legitimate enforcement power beyond their borders. As dis-
cussed previously, if a State exercises jurisdiction beyond its borders,
this assertion of jurisdiction will in many instances impinge on the sov-
ereignty of another State.3O However, this problem does not exist in all
instances, and may be minimized by the creation of the IMMCA. For
example, the tension between competing sovereigns is substantially re-
duced when the enforcing state is regulating its own nationals pursuant
to an international agreement; this is evident in the 1982 LOS Conven-
tion which obligates States to regulate their nationals regardless of
where a violation occurs.'O Similarly, this tension could be further re-
duced if party states give the IMMCA jurisdiction to assess compliance,
and enforcement is predicated on an IMMCA finding of non-
compliance by the offending party. Finally, the conflict between com-
298. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. For example, the Convention on
the International Trade in Endangered Species, supra note 276, bans the export and import of
certain endangered species. Under the CITES regime, party states must, through domestic
law, create controls on their citizens who wish to import or export endangered animals. See
generally Michelle Ann Peters, Comment, The Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species: An Answer to the Call of the Wild?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 169 (1994).
299. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 58 ("A court enforcing such laws might not mention
the treaty, but the treaty is implicitly being enforced."). Some domestic legal systems also
allow the direct enforcement of international law, without prior implementation through their
national legislature. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court has said:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial deci-
sion, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor,
research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 299 (1900).
300. See supra Part lI.B.
301. 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 8, at art. 217, 21 I.L.M. at 1312 (mandating that
"[s]tates shall ensure compliance by vessels flying their flag or of their registry with applica-
ble international rules and standards .... Flag states shall provide for the effective
enforcement of such rules, standards, laws and regulations, irrespective of where a violation
occurs"). See also id. at art. 117, 21 I.L.M. at 1291 ("All states have the duty to take, or to
co-operate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be
necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas."); Antarctic Protocol,
supra note 140, at art. 2 (requiring each party to exercise enforcement powers over their flag
ships and over ships supporting that government's Antarctic operations).
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peting sovereigns fully evaporates on the high seas, where no other sov-
ereign can, or does, claim jurisdiction."'
Once the IMMCA has found a party state, or its nationals, to be in
non-compliance, States have a number of enforcement mechanisms,
including: diplomatic pressure; adjudication in the recently created In-
ternational Court of Justice Chamber for Environmental Matters 3 or
other court of international jurisdiction; economic sanctions; and trade
restrictions. Additionally, a State may potentially choose to utilize more
"direct" forms of enforcement such as intervention by its coast guard3
or naval forces °.3 5 For instance, in early 1993, the U.S. State Department
announced that "if U.S. enforcement authorities have 'reasonable
grounds' to believe any foreign flag vessel is conducting or has con-
ducted large scale driftnet fishing .... U.S. authorities will take
appropriate 'law enforcement' action in accordance with agreements.'
True to its word, in May 1993, the U.S. Coast Guard intercepted two
Chinese vessels beyond the United States EEZ, believed to be violating
the UN moratorium on driftnet fishing, and ordered them to return to
China.
ii. Enforcement by NGOs
Perhaps, the most cost effective enforcement available to the inter-
national community is enforcement by NGOs. In many situations,
302. For a discussion of the underlying principles justifying the extraterritorial applica-
tion of domestic laws, see supra notes 74 and 82.
303. See Constitution of a Chamber of the Court for Environmental Matters, I.C.J.
Communique No. 93/20, July 19, 1993.
304. Rear Admiral James C. Card, Chief of the Office of Marine Safety, Security, and
Environmental Protection of the U.S. Coast Guard, remarked:
The Coast Guard has long been a proponent of achieving a comprehensive and
stable regime with respect to the uses of the oceans.... The Coast Guard, as the
primary U.S. actor operating in the maritime arena, strives to promote stewardship
of the marine environment-the central component in providing for long-term en-
vironmental quality. With a fleet of vessels and aircraft extending our influence
through the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and beyond, the Coast Guard is
uniquely positioned to promote compliance with the [1982 LOS] Convention as
we perform our stewardship mission.
James C. Card, Implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Coast
Guard Perspective, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 725, 728 (1995).
305. See generally Christopher A. Donesa, Protecting National Interests: The Legal
Status of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement by the Military, 41 DUKE L.J. 867, 869 (1992)
(noting that in some instances the "use of military resources abroad can be a legal exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction").
306. U.S. Says It Will Enforce Drifknet Fishing Moratorium, REUTER ASIA-PACIFIC
Bus. REP., March 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Reuapb File.
307. Coast Guard Sends Second Chinese Driftnetter Home, REUTERS, LTD., May 20,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library Txtnws File.
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enforcement by private entities such as international environmental or-
ganizations can be more persuasive than the more conventional
governmental approach."' This is so because NGOs are not restricted by
international politics or by formalistic predetermined protocols 1
Groups such as the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Greenpeace,
World Wildlife Fund, and the Natural Resources Defense Council can
address issues swiftly and without the necessity of navigating bureau-
cratic channels. In addition, because these organizations are
independently funded they can focus limited financial resources on dis-
crete issues and are less susceptible to domestic political pressures
associated with more formal funding sources31°
An IMMCA finding of noncompliance can be instrumental in pro-
viding international legitimacy to NGO enforcement procedures.
Furthermore, unlike party states who are sometimes concerned about
retaliation, NGOs are essentially "politically independent," and thus
generally more aggressive enforcers of international norms and stan-
dards." Consequently, NGOs are capable of utilizing a number of
enforcement techniques, including: focusing and directing public pres-
sure; organizing boycotts; bringing complaints to international
authorities; and taking direct action against violators.
NGOs are particularly well suited for focusing and directing public
pressure against states that violate international norms and standards.'
308. See Charnovitz, supra note 274, at 274 (noting the ways "NGOs can help govern-
ments secure.., implementation of new treaties"); Spencer, supra note 11, at 122 ("Often a
private entity, such as an international environmental organization, is more effective than a
more formal governmental approach.").
309. See Spencer, supra note 111, at 122. NGO activities, however, have received some
criticism:
More often than not, NGOs have been able to avoid the political paralysis of gov-
ernments in advancing their causes. They are "one-note Charlies" that serve a
special interest and have both the advantages-and afflictions-of tunnel vision.
As their star is rising, they are filling voids left by retreating governments. In some
cases, NGOs have even become involved in traditional government activities, such
as standard-setting, regulating and policing.
Crocker Snow, Jr., NGO Overreach: Greenpeace Pours Oil on Troubled Waters But Can't
Clean It Up, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 161 (1997).
310. Cf. Samaan, supra note 11, at 274 (noting that "[i]nternational agencies are neither
shackled by international politics or influenced by political pressures, since, for the most
part, they are generally privately funded").
311. See Charnovitz, supra note 274, at 274-75 ("NGOs may enhance the accountabil-
ity of governments by monitoring negotiating efforts. NGOs can also press compromises
upon reluctant negotiators.... NGOs may strengthen international agreements by monitor-
ing governmental compliance.").
312. See, e.g., Sands, supra note 61, at 394 (noting that NGOs "have been active for
many years in identifying threats to the environment, in attempting to force governments to
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A media savvy NGO with a network of grassroots volunteers can swiftly
"get the word out" about a State's transgressions."' Moreover, "[w]here
governments might be loathe for political reasons to censure each other,
the public feels no such compunction. 314 As the international public has
become more sensitive to environmental issues, governments appear to
be responding to that sensitivity."' For example, Japanese Fisheries
Minister Takashi Sato has acknowledged, while addressing Japan's
whaling policies, that "[i]f Japan's action to pursue research whaling
becomes a big issue and if criticism becomes accelerated, we will re-
consider our decision at that stage."''
Not surprisingly, NGOs have been quite successful at capitalizing
on the fact that public officials are particularly sensitive to publicity.
Because of their ability to mobilize public support, NGOs are often
essential to the creation and functioning of international environmental
regimes."7 For instance, NGOs were instrumental in initiating the first
truly worldwide campaign to stop the slaughter of whales."' "By
take measures to protect the environment, and in signaling breaches of existing international
environmental regulations").
313. As Captain Paul Watson of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society has instructed:
"Learn to use the media or you will be abused by the media. Media manipulation is merely a
matter of survival in a media culture." PAUL WATSON, EARTHFORCE: AN EARTH WARRIOR'S
GUIDE TO STRATEGY 36 (1993). See generally HERBERT MARSHALL MCLUHAN, LAWS OF
MEDIA: THE NEW SCIENCE (1988).
314. Spencer, supra note 111, at 123.
315. See Samaan, supra note 11, at 274. See generally LYNTON K. CALDWELL,
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: SCIENCE, THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT AND POLICY CHOICE
(1990). As then-UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali explained in 1994: "Non-governmental
organizations are a basic form of popular representation in the present day world. Their par-
ticipation in international organizations is, in a way, a guarantee of the political legitimacy of
those international organizations." Statement by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, reprinted in "THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD"; THE INFLUENCE OF NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE UN SYSTEM 311-12 (Peter Willetts ed., 1996).
316. Whale Pearl Harbor: U.S. Efforts to Keep Japan from Violating International
Whaling Moratorium, NAT'L REV., Apr. 1, 1988, at 22 ("Though they were willing to inter-
pret the treaty loosely so long as no one was watching, the Japanese are clearly less
enthusiastic about losing face.").
317. See Institutional Arrangements, supra note 28, at 1600-01 (observing that NGOs
"are often essential to the enactment of domestic implementing legislation"). For example,
the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, June 2, 1988, 27
I.L.M. 859, agreed to after six years of negotiations between thirty-three States, collapsed
due to the opposition of Jacques Cousteau and NGOs such as Greenpeace, the Environmental
Defense Fund, and the Wilderness Society. Institutional Arrangements, supra note 28, at
1600 n. 173. See also Paul Bogart, Antarctic Accord Must Protect Environment, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1989, at A26.
318. "In the 1960's, NGOs launched a worldwide publicity campaign to save the
whales." Cliff M. Stein, Whales Swim for Their Lives as Captain Ahab Returns in a Norwe-
gian Uniform: An Analysis of Norway's Decision to Resume Commercial Whaling, 8 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 155, 178 n.241 (1994) (citing RICHARD ELLIS, MEN AND WHALES 435
(1991)).
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presenting revealing news stories and graphic videos, the NGOs brought
the whaling issue to the attention of the global public and virtually
changed the history of whaling."319
NGOs have been especially effective at using their own form of
economic sanction-the boycott. ° In the past, NGOs have successfully
used boycotts to protect the marine environment, particularly marine
mammals.32" ' In 1986, for example, NGOs organized a boycott against
tuna companies to pressure them to stop using drift and gill nets to catch
tuna.2 NGOs also published dramatic, full page advertisements in ma-
jor newspapers and released a documentary film showing graphic scenes
of marine mammals being slaughtered.323 Today, tuna sellers assure the
public their tuna is dolphin-safe and "some tuna companies ask NGOs
to certify their tuna products as dolphin safe."324
NGO enforcement could be further enhanced if international envi-
ronmental organizations are given standing in national courts and
international tribunals.3" Currently, individuals and NGOs are precluded
from bringing citizen suits asserting environmental injuries in most ad-
judicative forums.326 Moreover, individual citizens completely lack
standing in the International Court of Justice.3" Providing standing for
NGOs to address environmental wrongs can be accomplished in two
ways: enlarging the jurisdiction of current international tribunals such as
319. Id. at 178 n.241 (citing RICHARD ELLIS, MEN AND WHALES 435 (1991)).
320. "[I]f [a boycott] can affect as little as 5 percent of sales, it can destroy the vast
majority of a company's profits." Tom Sietsema, Ready, Aim, Boycott, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24,
1993, at 1.
321. See Stein, supra note 319, at 179 ("NGOs have had success using boycotts to pro-
tect marine mammals from commercial slaughtering."). For example, "[iln response to
Norway's decision to resume commercial whaling, NGOs have called for public and corpo-
rate boycotts of Norwegian products and services." Id. at 179. As a result of these boycotts, it
is estimated that Norway lost at least US$58.5 million in export revenue and tourism income.
Boycott of Norwegian Fish Products Starts in Australia, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 16,
1993, available in 1993 WL 10757619. See also Economic Sanction Needed to Halt Norwe-
gian Whaling, Environmentalists Say, INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Nov. 19, 1992.
322. Sietsema, supra note 320, at 1/ZZL. NGOs organized massive letter-writing cam-
paigns targeted at congressional members and corporate leaders. Id. at I/ZZ1.
323. Id. at I/ZZ1.
324. See Stein, supra note 319, at 179 (citing Sietsema, supra note 320, at I/ZZ1).
325. See Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1577; Sands, supra note 61, at 414-
17 (arguing that flexible standing requirements would facilitate enforcement of supranational
rules).
326. See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing ?-Toward Legal
Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); Christopher D. Stone, Should
Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralistic Per-
spective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
327. See Tinker, supra note 284, at 807 n.58; Samaan, supra note 11, at 276 (noting
that "citizen suits concerning environmental injuries and duties may not be brought since
individual citizens lack standing in the International Court of Justice").
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the ICJ,32 or by granting NGOs standing in domestic courts through
domestic implementing legislation.29 In either forum, NGOs can be ex-
pected to bring many violators to justice.3"
Finally, creation of the IMMCA can be a significant aid to those
NGOs that are currently engaged in the day to day monitoring and en-
forcement of international environmental laws. IMMCA findings of
noncompliance will provide these NGOs with the legitimacy necessary
to take direct action against violating states and their nationals.
C. Benefits of an International Marine Monitoring
and Compliance Agency
The creation of an International Marine Monitoring and Coordina-
tion Agency will yield a number of potential benefits, including:
providing more cost effective protection of the marine environment by
lowering information and administrative costs; increasing the likelihood
that treaties will be signed; increasing the likelihood that parties will
remain in treaties; encouraging compliance; reducing the proliferation
of international bodies; and providing comprehensive global protection
of the marine environment.
First, the IMMCA will provide more cost effective protection by
lowering information costs and administrative costs. By developing
monitoring procedures and acting as a repository for information con-
cerning the marine environment, the IMMCA can lower the information
gathering and processing costs33' incurred by States, NGOs, and other
328. Some have suggested creating an environmental chamber within the ICJ with
broad jurisdiction. Global News: International Court of the Environment Foundation, 6 IJO
NEWSLETTER (Int'l Judicial Observer, Washington, D.C.), June 1994, No. 2. The creation of
alternative dispute resolution panels has also been suggested. American Bar Association
Working Group on Improving the Effectiveness of the United Nations, Report on Improving
the Effectiveness of the United Nations in Advancing the Rule of Law in the World, 29 INT'L
LAW 293, 295-96 (1995); Anderson, supra note 11, at 805 ("To safeguard our remaining
natural resources, nations must be more willing to forgo part of their sovereignty by agreeing
to resolve environmental claims before arbitration panels or to submit to the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).").
329. If party states are required to "adopt measures" necessary to ensure compliance, as
most agreements currently require, it is logical that those measures should include some
means for NGOs and individuals to compel errant actors to comply. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987). Extraterritorial jurisdiction includes
"judicial jurisdiction" which is commonly described as a nation's authority to "subject per-
sons or things to the process of its courts or tribunals." Id. at § 401(b).
330. See Sand, supra note 260, at 271-73; Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at
1607 (noting that "[i]n the formalized European Community complaint procedures, NGOs
bring many of the strongest complaints against member-states").
331. Economist George Stigler has remarked that "information costs are the costs of
transportation from ignorance to omniscience, and seldom can a [person] afford to take the
entire trip." George J. Stigler, Imperfections in the Capital Market, 75 J. POL. ECON. 287,
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international organizations. Because the IMMCA will actively analyze
and disseminate information, it will also lower the information costs of
party states and NGOs engaged in enforcement activities.332 In addition,
by centralizing monitoring efforts and facilities, States will reduce re-
dundant expenditures and thus reduce overall information related
expenditures.
Second, the IMMCA will increase the likelihood that treaties will be
signed. Many States are reluctant to enter treaties because of the per-
ceived relinquishment of their sovereignty. Where the IMMCA is the
arbiter of compliance, however, a potential state should anticipate less
"interference" with its sovereignty because no one State or small group
of States is determining another State's compliance. In addition, as-
suming the IMMCA has created adequate participation mechanisms, the
international community will likely regard the IMMCA's decision proc-
ess as legitimate;... this will provide assurance to potential party states
that they will be treated fairly.
Third, the IMMCA will also increase the likelihood that parties will
remain in treaties and comply with their existing treaty obligations.
Through its active information dissemination procedures, the IMMCA
can establish links with grassroots organizations and political constitu-
encies that can nurture an environmental ethic within individual states
and their national governments."' In addition, IMMCA links with local
political organizations can help mitigate problems concerning domestic
291 (1967). See also Carl Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148
(1979) (suggesting that transaction costs include: (1) search and information costs; (2) bar-
gaining and decision costs; and (3) policing and enforcement costs). Dahlman indicates,
however, that "this functional taxonomy of different transaction costs is unnecessarily elabo-
rate: functionally, the three classes reduce to a single one-for they all have in common that
they represent resource losses due to lack of information." Id. at 148. See generally Armen
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
332. Cf. Assent and Enforcement, supra note i1, at 1564 ("By gathering, analyzing, and
distributing environmental data, international agencies can lower the costs of these actors,
and in so doing raise the probability that they will become involved in the enforcement
process.").
333. See supra Part V.A(iii).
334. See Charnovitz, supra note 274, at 274-75 ("NGOs may enhance the accountabil-
ity of governments by monitoring negotiating efforts. NGOs can also press compromises
upon reluctant negotiators.... NGOs may strengthen international agreements by monitor-
ing governmental compliance."); Assent and Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1573 ("By
maintaining contacts with environmentalists and experts, the agencies can influence national
policy from within the state, working with and within national governments to train officials
and foster an environmental ethic."); cf. Traffic in Women and Children: Report on the Inter-
national Women's Associations, League of Nations Doc. C.T.FE 234 (1925), at 6 (noting
that without well-organized, well-equipped social organizations, legislators would find it
impossible to apply protective laws which are being asked for).
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implementation and compliance. "Public awareness and cooperation, as
opposed to coercive enforcement, are the foundation of many environ-
mental policies." '335
Fourth, the IMMCA will reduce the proliferation of international
bodies and reduce overlapping institutional structures. As previously
noted, the number of international organizations is remarkable. 36 Not
surprisingly, these organizations' environmental activities often over-
lap.33 7 The current understaffed, over-bureaucratized system hampers the
effective implementation and enforcement of international environ-
mental agreements. Because the IMMCA will consist of one body
performing monitoring and compliance functions, many levels of bu-
reaucracy within the current system can be replaced. The creation of an
international compliance and monitoring agency may be particularly
timely in light of current reform efforts at the United Nations.3 Moreo-
ver, the IMMCA would be fully capable of performing the duties
required by most environmental treaties: "[u]nder the disjointed legal
mechanisms currently in place, treaty secretariats act independently de-
spite the fact that they often share similar mandates, perform similar
functions, and require similar institutional arrangements." '339
Finally, creation of the IMMCA is an important step toward a
comprehensive global solution for the problems facing the marine
environment-and the world's environment as a whole. The importance
of global cooperation and coordination in the creation and
335. Institutional Arrangements, supra note 18, at 1601.
336. See supra Part IV.A.
337. See Jacobson & Kay, supra note 279, at 9-13.
338. David Birenbaum, former ambassador of the United States to the United Nations
for Management and Reform, summarized the present situation at the UN as follows:
Organizational reform is indispensable. The U.N. system's current complicated
structure, much of it put in place by the member states, defies effective manage-
ment, defeats accountability, ensures wasteful duplication of effort and robs the
organization of critically needed resources. For example, more than 150 separate
bodies report to the Economic and Social Council. There are 12 bodies concerned
with oceans and coasts, eight with agriculture and food, seven with forests, six
with fresh water, eight with the environment, seven with health and six with nutri-
tion.
A new emphasis on performance requires the wholesale consolidation of func-
tions, elimination of redundant or irrelevant bodies and programs, reorganization
of the Secretariat into fewer departments, a reduction in the number of undersec-
retaries and assistant secretaries-general, creation of a deputy secretary general
with a reform and management mandate, and a far more effective means of getting
the U.N. and its specialized agencies to function as a system.
David Birnbaum, Threshold of Options for U.N. Reforms, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 10,
1997, at A13.
339. Anderson, supra note 11, at 781.
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implementation of environmental agreements cannot be overempha-
sized. The current "patchwork" system of jurisdiction and responsibility
fails to recognize the interconnectedness of the earth's living and non-
living systems. The IMMCA is especially necessary because many
marine organisms are migratory and, as history has borne out, only a
comprehensive organization can effectively coordinate the actions of all
nations. Assuming that at some point the IMMCA will have monitoring
responsibility for all of the world's oceans and marine life, this will
assure that information is available for the integration and coordination
of conservation objectives.'
CONCLUSION
The lack of a centralized supranational authority is often cited as the
crucial barrier to effective environmental protection. Ecosystems, indi-
vidual species, and pollution do not respect political boundaries; why
should pirate whalers and driftnetters respect them? They do not be-
cause they know they can continue to ply their trade without fear of
sanction. The condition of the world's oceans is startling. As important
as the few conservation victories have been (such as dolphins and some
whale species), the fact remains that there is no international system in
place that can effectively conserve marine organisms.
The proposed International Marine Monitoring and Coordination
Agency attempts to rectify this deficiency. Although the solution sug-
gested here may be subject to criticism, the reasons for adopting such an
approach outweigh the objections, particularly in the absence of more
viable alternatives. Compared to other proposals, the IMMCA is a mod-
est solution. The IMMCA will not create laws nor will it directly
pressure individual states to create laws or to comply with their existing
340. The acute need for the integration and coordination of conservation objectives
within the UN was recently highlighted by the Secretary General:
Institutional arrangements for ocean management remain fragmented, however,
with problematic divisions of responsibility between areas under national jurisdic-
tion and international waters. It is also evident that, while important agreements
have been concluded at the global level, implementation will be better addressed
at the regional level, where the management mandate and capacity of existing or-
ganizations needs strengthening.
Report of the Secretary General, Overall Progress Achieved Since The United Nations Con-
ference On Environment And Development, E/CN.17/1997/2 (Jan. 31, 1997). See also
Anderson, supra note 11, at 782 ("The establishment of a new international environmental
oversight body could catalyze the consolidation of basic environmental principles and the
resolution of the difficulties currently plaguing the international environmental legal struc-
ture.").
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obligations. Instead, the IMMCA will monitor, assess, and open its
processes, decisionmaking, and conclusions to the public.
It is this author's opinion that the future success of environmental
protection lies in strengthening the role of autonomous non-
governmental organizations. Many NGOs have broad support from the
citizens of many countries. They are "in tune" with individual prefer-
ences and able to influence individual desires. If the average Japanese,
Taiwanese, Norwegian, American, and Russian can not be persuaded to
change, then no amount of international regulation is ultimately going to
succeed in keeping "pirates". from exploiting the oceans. In this regard,
the IMMCA is well suited. Its information dissemination procedures
recognize that grassroots NGOs can educate and influence. In the end,
this form of public participation sidesteps the difficult issue of state
sovereignty.
Certainly, one of the criticisms of the proposed IMMCA is that the
international community will never allow a supranational authority to
have such broad jurisdiction. The truth, however, may be just the oppo-
site; supranational organizations already exist in the form of the UN
Security Council and the growing European Union?" These suprana-
tional authorities are accepted because "world peace" and "economic
prosperity" are considered important enough to justify the relinquished
sovereignty. Environmental issues must be elevated to the same status.
341. Instead of pulling apart, nations appear to be seeking "economic allies" in the
form of super-regional trade agreements. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605. Indeed, as evidenced by the
debate surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement, proponents see these super-
regional agreements as critical for economic prosperity.
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